Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of Scientific Innovations and Practical Applications by Birke, Richard
Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of
Scientific Innovations and Practical Applications
RICHARD BIRKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Neuroscience, and neuroimaging in particular, holds the promise to allow
unprecedented access to the mechanisms of the brain as it considers
information and makes decisions.1 This newfound ability to literally peer into
the brain while it assimilates information, makes decisions, and evaluates
offers creates unparalleled opportunities to advance our understanding of the
reasons why some disputes settle and others do not. 2
Neuroscience has become the object of quite a bit of attention in the
scientific and popular press, and expectations are high that new technological
advances will result in important practical advances in the way we interact
with each other and the way we make decisions. Many books have been
written in the past few years that are the products of good journalists
reporting about the work of important neuroscientists, and by neuroscientists
who are blessed with the storyteller's gift.3 The public's longing for hard,
* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; Director,
Willamette Center for Dispute Resolution. Thanks to the faculties of the Duke University
Cognitive Neuroscience Department, the Arizona State University law school, the
American Bar Association, the Master Mediators Institute, the Oregon Mediation
Association and the Washington Bar Association for providing opportunities to workshop
the research that culminated in this article.
1 The notion that the brain considers information or makes decisions is controversial,
with most scientists and philosophers in agreement that there is a brain-mind distinction.
From Descartes (cogito, ergo sum) to the thinkers of our time, the brain has been
considered the mechanism of the mind, but not its container. References in this article to
the brain as an active decisionmaker are meant to serve as shorthand, not as scientific
stance. For purposes of this article, it will be irrelevant whether the brain is doing the
driving, whether a mind outside the brain is doing the driving or whether there is, in fact,
a "Ghost in the Machine." See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15-16 (1949); see
also Keith A. Johnson, A Neurolmaging Primer, http://www.med.harvard.edu/AANLlB/
hmsl.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
2 One new moniker for the emerging field is "decision neuroscience." See Baba Shiv
et al., Decision Neuroscience, 16 MARKETING LETrERs, 375-86 (2005).
3 See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK (2005); DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL
INTELLIGENCE (2006) (focusing in part on the work of Joseph LeDoux); MARCO
IACABONI, MIRRORING PEOPLE (2008); JOSEPH LEDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN (2008);
DAvID LINDEN, THE ACCIDENTAL MIND: How BRAIN EVOLUTION HAS GIVEN Us LOVE,
MEMORY, DREAMs, AND GOD (2008); DREw WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE
OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
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physical, scientific explanations for behavior and the seductive quality of
photographic evidence combine to fuel the desire to convert laboratory data
into daily practice. Neuroscience is so promising in part because the kind of
biological data produced are qualitatively different from those produced by
the traditional fields employed by students of decisionmaking, namely
economics and psychology. Unlike these fields, neuroscience comes with
pictures-pictures of brains caught in the act of making decisions.
Negotiators and mediators are among those who hope that neuroscience
can make them better at what they do. While economics, psychology, and
cultivated self-awareness have all contributed mightily to understanding
negotiation, each of these modes of analysis suffers from inherent
limitations. In classes, books, articles, and continuing education workshops,
negotiators and mediators study game theory (notably the "prisoner's
dilemma") and utility maximization (under the banner of "value creation").4
Neoclassical economic principles inform all decision theory, but the
4 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11 (1994); ROGER FISHER
& WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); David Lax & James Sebenius, Claiming
Value, in THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 117, 117-53 (1986); Ronald J. Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243
(1984); Cf Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369
(1996).
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foundation provided by the rational actor model has come increasingly under
attack, and economics is sometimes dismissed as sterile and unrealistic.
Cognitive and behavioral psychology have contributed at least thirty-five
distinct principles that impact the way lawyers negotiate, including such
prominent contributions as loss aversion and prospect theory.5 With each
passing year, they contribute more. This field's limitations may be related to
its successes-principles of psychology mapped in isolation offer little help
to the dispute resolver who encounters them in combination. Studying
decisions by studying oneself takes the form of negotiation journals,
reflection memoranda, self-diagnostics such as the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict
Mode Instrument or the Myers-Briggs test, and mindfulness. 6 The ubiquity of
simulation-based negotiation and mediation training, the prevalence of
reflective writing assignments in classes, and the pervasive interest in skill
building in areas related to creativity, listening, and neutrality are three
testaments to the interrelationship between consensual dispute resolution and
interpersonal skill building.7 However useful interpersonal skill building may
be to understand the mental process of decisionmaking, it is necessarily
limited by intersubjectivity. No comprehensive registry catalogues what is
common and what is eclectic. Thus, despite contributions from economics,
psychology, and self-study, negotiators and mediators still want perspective
on how and why people make decisions under conditions of risk and
uncertainty.
5 Originally discussed in 1738, Daniel Bernoulli's solution to brother Nicolas' "St.
Petersburg Paradox" illuminated such matters as why gamblers bet less when they are
"up" and why marginally diminishing returns give rise to a decreasing sensitivity to
gains. Daniel Bernoulli & Amos Tversky, Exposition of a New Theory on the
Measurement of Risk, 22 ECONOMETRICA 23, 23-35 (1954); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979).
6 See KENNETH W. THOMAS & RALPH KILLMAN, THOMAs-KILLMAN CONFLICT MODE
INSTRUMENT (2009), available at http://wivw.kilmann.comJconflict.htm-l; see also
Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 79 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential
Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2002); The Myers & Briggs Foundation, MBTI Basics,
http://www.myersbriggs.org/my-mbti-personality-type/mbti-basics (last visited Nov. 25,
2009).
7 Becky L. Jacobs, Teaching and Learning Negotiation in a Simulated Environment,
18 WIDENER L. REv. 91 (2008); Philip G. Schrag, The Serpent Strikes: Simulation in a
Large First-Year Class, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 555 (1989); Gerald Williams, Using
Simulation Exercises for Negotiation and Other Dispute Resolution Courses, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 307, 311-12 (1984).
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It is, therefore, no mystery why decisionmakers have turned a hopeful
eye toward neuroscience.8 Recent scientific advances have enabled a new
and radically different approach to studying the process of decisionmaking.
In particular, the innovation that is most likely to lead the great leap forward
is the functional magnetic resonance imager (fMRI). Employing powerful
magnets that react to minute differences in levels of oxygenated and
deoxygenated hemoglobin in the brain, the fMRI can create near-moving
pictures that allow studying the location, intensity, and duration of brain
activity under conditions similar to those found during negotiation and
mediation. The data collected by fMRI holds the potential to add
significantly to the understanding of how to negotiate and mediate more
effectively. The desire to obtain visual data about the brain has led the fMRI
8 Unfortunately for dispute resolvers and others interested in areas of law other than
criminal, the overwhelming bulk of the legal literature devoted to neuroscience has been
devoted to the area of criminal responsibility. A Westlaw search conducted on May 23,
2009 looking for the term "neuro" in the title of all law reviews and journal articles
turned up 135 responses. Of these, well more than half deal exclusively with criminal
responsibility, and of the remainder, most deal with childhood development or issues
related to medicine. As of this writing, virtually no attention has been paid to
neuroscience and dispute resolution. There are, thankfully, some entries into the field, but
they are few and far between. For one notable exception, see Kenneth Cloke, Bringing
Oxytocin into the Room: Notes on the Neurophysiology of Conflict, MEDIATE.COM, Jan.
2009, http://www.mediate.com/articles/cloke8.cfm.
Another notable exception is Owen Jones, who is both a law professor and a
neuroscientist. He is emphatic that biology be included in discussions about decision
theory. In 2000, he wrote:
[Tiheories of economics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and all
the rest must be consistent, in the end, with the basic principles of biology.
The most basic principle of biology, in turn, is evolution-particularly
evolution by natural selection. Natural selection occurs in any system in which there
is differential reproductive success as a function of heritable variation. Put simply,
any population of replicators, in which variations in heritable traits affect future
replicative success, will tend, over generations, to accumulate an increasing
proportion of traits that contribute to replicative success.
The power of this deceptively simple insight-and its ultimate relevance to
law-lies in its ability to explain not only species-typical patterns of form, but also
species-typical patterns of behavior (or what some people term a species-typical
nature). More specifically, natural selection shapes the physical and chemical
information-processing pathways of the brain in ways that have tended, over time, to
contribute to the survival and reproductive success of organisms that bear them.
Owen D. Jones, On the Nature ofNorms: Biology, Morality and the Disruption of Order,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2074 (2000).
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to "quickly become the most prominent tool in cognitive neuroscience." 9
Literally thousands of new experiments are performed each year.
The horizon may be full of promising avenues and existing data points,
but the terrain is riddled with traps. There is reason for concern that interest
in neuroscience may have already caused its applications to outpace the
validity of the science.10 The scientific community and the community of
9 Russell A. Poldrack, The Role of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Do We
Stand?, 18 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 223, 223 (2008). "Since its invention in
the early 1990's to the end of 2007, more than 12,000 articles have been published that
mention fMRI in the abstract or title, and this number is growing by roughly 30-40
papers every week." Id.
The reasons why neuroscience is of current interest are many, but here are two that
loom large. First, the use of fMRI machines by researchers who care primarily about
decisionmaking, not medical diagnoses, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Where the
first fvIRI machines were both rare and expensive, they were reserved for intensive
medical needs. As is the case with all technology, as time passed the price of the
technology dropped, companies produced more fMRI machines, and the supply of
machines expanded. With a little more market saturation, machines that are still quite
expensive are nonetheless available for decision research. When brain activity can be
recorded in real time, and then compared to known information gleaned primarily from
studies of animal brains, brains of corpses, and especially from brains of people who
suffered particular injuries to certain parts of the brain, decisions can be correlated with
activity in sections of the brain. A researcher may then attempt to correlate the decision
with the function, and known attributes of the functional area may be viewed as having a
relationship with the decision.
Second, the fMRI presents the possibility of finding some objective, universal truths
about behavior in a way that existing fields lack. Where interpersonal learning presents
problems in determining which behaviors of the student are personal and which are
universal, neuroscience may show that all brains (or most all brains) are alike in certain
fundamental ways. Where economics traffics in behavioral aspirations, neuroscience
tends toward a more agnostic approach, dealing in physical phenomena. There is no
conflict between pure rationality and limited rationality-there are merely activated areas
and correlated behavior and stimuli. Similarly, where psychology deals in tendencies and
behaviors, the ftMR captures undeniable, unconcealable pictures of brain activity. If a
physical connection can be established through observation of real time brain functions
during decisions, there may be a set of universal behavioral prescriptions that will
facilitate more effective decisionmaking than eclectic self-study, aspirational economics,
or probabilistic psychology.
10 George Annas writes:
It is, of course, the immediacy and seeming infallibility of pictures that make
them simultaneously valuable and dangerous. Their potential to provide vivid and
compelling, but simultaneously misleading, information is at the heart of many of
the articles on neuroimaging in this issue. There is a rich history of utilizing 'junk
science' to try to correlate brain structure with brain function, most compellingly
illustrated by the rise and fall of phrenology.
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practitioners are at odds over the readiness of neuroscience for broad
application. One example concerns something called "Mirror Neurons.""
These neurons react in a sympathetic way to the neuronal expression of
emotion by others. The viewer is purported to feel the emotion portrayed by
the person whose face expresses the original feeling because the viewer's
mirror neurons line up in a similar magnetic pattern to those of the expresser.
The idea that humans are "hard-wired for empathy" is a very attractive one
for negotiators, mediators, and others whose livelihoods are based in part on
their ability to empathize with others, and to create environments in which
disputants may empathize with their opponent. Some researchers have
developed mirror neuron based therapies at a time when many prominent
neuroscientists are uncertain whether humans possess anything that can be
properly called a mirror neuron. 12 Some scientists are downright derisive,
penning articles with Onion-style satiric titles like, "Mirror Neurons May Be
Responsible for Global Warming & U.S. Economic Woes." 13
A second cautionary example is found in technology that purports to
prevent terrorist attacks, investigate crimes, and hire reliable workers. fMRI
lie detection has been held up as a viable means of testing by at least two
companies, while scientists argue that the data on fMiRI lie detection fail to
George J. Annas, Foreword, Imagining a New Era of Neuroimaging, Neuroethics and
Neurolaw, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 163 (2007).
11 IACABONI, supra note 3.
12 See Ti-Fei Yuan & Robert Hoff, Mirror Neuron System Based Therapy for
Emotional Disorders, 71 MED. HYPOTHESES 722 (2008). While I did not ask permission
to include their names, I have asked more than a dozen prominent academic
neuroscientists in various subdisciplines and in a variety of institutions on both coasts and
in between about their opinions about mirror neurons. The most charitable thing I heard
is that "Iacoboni is kind of alone out there on this," to expressions of significant derision
bordering on disgust. Not one person was willing to admit that there was proof or
consensus that mirror neurons exist in humans.
That said, several very prominent and well-respected scientists endorse the book on
its jacket. I am convinced that despite the opinions of the unnamed academics, there must
be some there. In section IV.A, I spend more time with the idea of mirror neurons and its
applicability to mediation. There I will discuss at somewhat greater length my cognitive
dissonance with the opinions of the neuroscientists and my experience of reading
lacaboni's book.
13 Consider such actual Onion headlines as: Report: Increasing Number of
Educators Found to be Suffering from Teaching Disabilities, THE ONION, May 25, 2009,
available at http://www.theonion.com/content/news/report-increasingnumber-of. See
also Antonia Demasio & Kaspar Meyer, Behind the Looking Glass, 454 NATURE 167
(2008).
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support commercial claims. 14 The companies supporting fMRI lie detection
promote the idea that the fMRI helps determine whether a subject is telling
the truth or not; however, opposing scientists argue that the fMRI presents
such vivid images that people impute too much weight to the research that
accompanies the photographs. Vividness becomes a surrogate for validity.' 5
In the debate between those who would run with the data and those who
encourage caution, count me among the hopeful that fMRI imaging and other
recent advances in neuroscience will significantly advance our understanding
of negotiation, mediation, and decisionmaking. However, my enthusiasm is
tempered by fear of adopting beliefs based in data that may soon be
debunked. In addition, the volume of research being conducted is
overwhelming, and precious few of the thousands of studies conducted each
year offer insights that are of immediate relevance to the rather limited (or
refined) interests of the dispute resolution community.
Fortunately, neuro-decisionmaking books and articles have begun to
permeate the popular press, and it is now possible for the interested layperson
to engage in rigorous but accessible study. Over the course of several years, I
have read popular books and neuroscience articles (some mainstream and
others quite obscure), have attended many lectures, watched videos and
heard news reports, attended a brain dissection, and observed fMRI and other
types of brain scans. As a mediator, negotiator, and law professor by
profession, and a neuroscience fan by avocation, this immersion feels like a
small scratch on a vast surface. But I have learned enough to believe that
neuroscience offers new insights into how individuals negotiate and mediate.
My purpose in this article is to share some of what I have found so far in my
examination of potential applications of recent advances in neuroscience to
the practical and scholarly world of consensual dispute resolution,
specifically mediation and negotiation.16 I focus on work that has reached the
popular press-these works are at once the most promising and the most
14 Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience Based Lie Detection: The Urgent
Need for Regulation, 33 AMER. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007).
15 David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain
Images on Judgments of Scientific Imaging, 107 COGNITION 343 (2008); Deena Skolnick
Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008); Paul Bloom, fMRI Images Have Captivated Headline
Writers, Grant Committees and the Public Beyond Their Actual Scientific Worth:
Seduced by the Flickering Lights of the Brain, SEED, June 27, 2006, http://www.seedmag
azine.com/content/article/seducedby the-flickeringlights-of the brain.
16 While there are undoubtedly applications of these findings to legal advocacy,
these are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993); Bob Gibbins, Closing Argument: Consolidating
Your Theme, in TRIAL BY JURY 1025 (2008).
483
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
likely to incite unwarranted applications. In focusing on both the promise and
limitation of popular contemporary neuroscience, I hope to illuminate
whether neuroscience has produced findings that form a sufficiently reliable
basis for the transformation of mediation practice.
The remainder of this article consists of four sections. The first two
sections are in the nature of background, one pertaining to decision theory in
law--economics and psychology-and the other to a fuller explanation of
the science of neuroscience. For readers conversant or uninterested in such
background material, these sections can be skipped without much
consequence; but for the uninitiated, they may prove helpful to understanding
whether neuroscience is capable of making significant advances relative to
pre-existing modes of inquiry. In the third section, I apply neuroscientific
findings to a series of moments in a typical mediation (if such a thing can be
said to exist). The phases and associated neuroscientific studies are as
follows:
* Phase One-The Opening Statement: Mirror Neurons & Universal
Facial Expression17
* Phase Two-Telling The Tale: Fear Networks And The Executive
Function Of The Brain18
* Phase Three-Passing Information: Confirmation Bias & Reactive
Devaluation In The fMRIl 9
* Phase Four-Thinking About Offers: Presentism And Problems
Associated With Predicting State Of Mind20
* Phase Five--Closing In On The Deal: Loss Aversion And The
fMRI21
* Last Ditch Efforts-Mediator Proposals: Invoking Involuntary
Pleasure22
In the third section I will also draw out connections between the studies
and the practices, and to accurately indicate how much support exists among
the scientific community for a suggestion for practice.
In the final part of this article, I suggest that the inherent limitation of
neuroscience to show exclusive causal effects between brain activity and
17 See infra sec. IV.A.
18 See infra sec. IV.B.
19 See infra sec. IV.C.
20 See infra sec. IV.D.
21 See infra sec. IV.E.
22 See infra sec. IV.F.
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behavior constitutes a problem for the scientific researcher, but not for the
practicing mediator. Problems associated with the separate study of
neuroscience and legal decisionmaking might be overcome by creation of a
dialogue designed to produce testable hypotheses that are of scientific
interest, are amenable to scientific scrutiny of the highest level, but also have
the most immediate impact to the lives of professionals vested with the
responsibility of resolving conflict effectively.23 I argue that mediators and
negotiators ought to consider whether scientific standards of proof are
appropriately applied to the practice of law, or whether a better standard or
burden of proof might be one lower than that required for publication in a
scientific journal but of sufficient explanatory power that it ought to be
adopted as a guideline until proven unreliable. I dub the intermediate
standard of proof "resonance." I end with some modest offerings at testable
hypotheses in hope to spark conversation between neuroscientists and the
dispute resolution community.
II. WHAT LAWYERS ALREADY KNow ABOUT DECISIONMAKING
Every field stands on the shoulders of its predecessors, and were it not
for economists trying to determine how to make good decisions and
demonstrating how economic rationality must be relaxed to fit human
decisionmaking, neuroscientists would have a scant idea of how to test
decisionmaking in the fMRI.
As neuroscience owes a debt to economics and psychology, so does law.
There are literally thousands of scholarly papers on law and economics, some
of which have been awarded Nobel Prizes. Similarly, law journals are filled
with contextual explorations of the work of great psychologists.
As a prelude to the discussion of new neuroscientific studies that fill
section III of this paper, I now briefly describe relevant aspects of the fields
of economics and psychology so that readers may accurately assess whether
neuroscience has advanced decisionmaking, and if so, by how much. I also
discuss some of the limitations of each field. None of these background
sections is an attempt at an exhaustive survey of the fields; rather, I focus on
the concepts that appear most regularly in dispute resolution courses and
literature.
23 Owen Jones has gone so far as to declare that "knowledge of human behavior
must in the end be seamless between disciplines, [so] that the extraordinary growth of
behavioral biology renders obsolete any law-relevant model of human behavior that fails
to integrate life science perspectives with social science ones. . . ." Owen D. Jones, The
Evolution ofIrrationality, 41 JURIMETRICS 289, 293 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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A. Economic Concepts Impacting Negotiation and Mediation
From economics, decisionmakers have learned about expected value
calculations and litigation risk analysis, as well as the Coase Theorem, game
theory, utility maximization, and more. 24 Principles form the bedrock of
much of our system of law, with the reasonable person standard embodied in
tort law and principles of "highest, best use" utility maximization
underpinning much of property law.25 However, economics can be sterile
and unrealistic. The "rational" person theory of decisionmaking is useful if
people are rational, and of lesser value if they are not; ample evidence
suggests that they are not. To the contrary, a robust literature demonstrates
that three fundamental underpinnings of rational theory-context
independence, description invariance, and process independence-are
systematically violated when actual humans-as opposed to hypothetical
rational decisionmakers-are in command of the decision.26
1. Utility Maximization and Value Creation
In the late 1800s, neoclassical economics "replaced the individual
economic agent as a sociological or historical datum by the utility-
maximizing individual." 27 The idea of an actor who sought, with every action
and every decision, to increase his or her personal well-being became central
24 For litigation analysis, see Richard Birke, Decision Trees-Made Easy, in
LAWYER NEGOTIATION 160 (Jay Folberg & Dwight Golann eds., 2005); Marc B. Victor,
Litigation Risk AnalysisTM and ADR, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON AND IRVINE ADR
PRACTICE BOOK § 17 (John H. Wilkinson ed., 1990), available at http://www.litigationris
k.com/Litigation%20Risk%20Analysis(tm)%20and%20ADR.pdf; Marjorie Corman
Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Using Decision Trees as Tools for Settlement, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 71, 71 (1996). For the Coase theorem, see Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 5 (1960). For the game theory,
see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994). For utility
maximization, see Anthony Ogus, What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and
Economics, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 384 (2004).
25 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV.
757 (2009); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing,
the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816-22 (2001)
(discussing the history and use of this standard).
26 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
27 George Stigler, Does Economics Have a Useful Past?, 1 HIST. OF POL. EcoN. 217,
225 (1969).
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to economic thinking. "[T]he rationality of neoclassical theory, assumes that
the decisionmaker has a comprehensive, consistent utility function, knows all
the alternatives that are available for choice, can compute the expected value
of utility associated with each alternative, and chooses the alternative that
maximizes expected utility."28
In economics, rationality speaks not to particular preferences, but rather
to decisions made to obtain such preferences. If a decisionmaker prefers ice
cream to dollars, the economist casts no professional judgment of
irrationality on the decisionmaker. However, mathematical rules apply to the
judgment of all decisions. For example, the mathematical principle of
transitivity dictates that if A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A
must be greater than C. So it is with preferences in economics: If a person
prefers doughnuts to dollars and dollars to gold jewelry, then he must prefer
doughnuts to gold jewelry, else he would be deemed irrational.
This idea of a rational maximizer found a home in law in the form of law
and economics.29 Utility maximizing economic thinking worked firmly to the
very core of the American legal system-both in the education and
administration of law. 30
The concept of utility maximization also lies at the core of nearly all
attempts to teach dispute resolution to law students and lawyers. The phrases
"win-win" and "value-creation" are traceable to Getting to Yes, but
regardless of whether this best-selling work is the origin or merely a widely-
read rehash, the dominance of these ideas in American dispute resolution
education can hardly be argued. 31 Economic models of decisionmaking touch
the core of dispute resolution.
28 HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS 17 (1997). While
Simon is a critic of the rational school, his characLerization of the classical economic
actor is widely shared. Id.
29 For a more thorough version of the history of law and economics, see THE
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICs: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 12 (Francesco
Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A
Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163
(1983) (describing the history of the extraordinarily influential Chicago School of Law
and Economics).
30 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1977); Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
31 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHoUT
GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991).
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2. Expected Value Calculations and Valuing Forgone Trials
Professor Marc Galanter reports that less than 1.8% of all filed cases
result in verdicts.32 When a lawyer is considering settlement value, he has
little in the way of verdicts in comparable cases to use to help formulate a
settlement range. Instead, valuation of trial results becomes either a matter of
guesswork about one's opponent's reservation value or of considering risk,
uncertainty, and value. These latter factors are amenable to combination as a
decision tree, and in that form, have become a viable method for valuing
litigation. 33
However, risk analysis depends on one's ability to forecast with accuracy
events that may not be easily predicted. Will a witness persuade a jury? Will
a piece of evidence be admitted or excluded? If a jury returns a verdict, what
amount will it be? While litigation risk analysis can help ballpark an offer, it
suffers from problems related to inability to accurately forecast probabilities,
from partisan tendencies to overvalue information confirming desired pre-
existing hypotheses, and from pervasive overconfidence and optimism. 34
While imperfect, litigation risk analysis is still widely taught, useful
when used appropriately, and one more example of how economic forms of
decisionmaking made their way into the practice of law and into the field of
dispute resolution.
3. Coase and the Relegation ofLaw to the Shadows
In 1960 Ronald Coase proclaimed that in a world where the costs of
bargaining are zero, legislative or judicial allocation of legal rights is near
irrelevant to outcomes. A succinct summary of the Coase Theorem is that
"[i]f there are no transaction costs in changing rights, the outcome will be
32 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIICAL LEGAL STuD. 459 (2004); see also
David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 113
(1996).
33 For examples of articles and practice tips, see supra note 24. See also James E.
McGuire, Practical Tips for Using Risk Analysis in Mediation, in AMERICAN
ARBITRATION AssOcIAION HANDBOOK ON MEDIATION 139 (Thomas E. Carbonneau et
al., eds., 2006); Eleanor Barr, Making Sound Decisions: How to Help Your Client
Evaluate Settlement Options, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 65
(2006); David P. Hoffer, Decision Analysis as a Mediator's Tool, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 113 (1996).
34 See infra pp. 507-10.
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efficient by private agreements. Hence, the initial allocation of rights will not
influence the efficiency of the final allocation."35
This Nobel Prize winning work relegates law to second chair. Only when
the law manages to impose hurdles to efficiency-long delays and high filing
fees, for example-will law trump economics. In this regard, Coase shares a
great deal with modem dispute resolvers-the law casts a shadow on
negotiations, but the search for an agreement is generally influenced more by
the costs and inefficiency of the legal process, not exclusively (or in some
cases, primarily) on the endowments provided to the parties by the
substantive law.36
4. The Prisoner's Dilemma
In the classical prisoner's dilemma, participants face a choice to
cooperate or compete with a fellow player. The players have no means to
make binding precommitments about their actions, and payoffs are
dependent not only on the choices they make, but also on their partner's
choices as well. The hierarchy of payoffs is lead by a "temptation" payoff in
which player one scores the most points if he competes in the face of player
two's cooperation. The second highest payoff occurs when both players
cooperate. The next best payoff occurs when both players compete. The
worst payoff for player one occurs when she cooperates and player two
competes.
The "moral" of the prisoner's dilemma is that in each round, when faced
with a decision to cooperate or compete, each player does better if he
competes, no matter what the other player does. However, if both players
follow this logic, at the result is a stable but suboptimal outcome. The lessons
from the prisoner's dilemma are typically either that players should engage in
repeat play with no known end and a looming future, or that they should
contract around the incentives to compete.37
3 5 MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 143 (2003).
36 See Jones, supra note 8, at 2100-01.
37 See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLuTION OF COOPERATION (Basic Books
2006) (1984). The necessary requirements of a prisoner's dilemma game are that the
players cannot communicate or bind each other to commitments, each must choose to
cooperate or compete and the payoffs are as described in the text. Often referred to as the
"temptation, reward, punishment and sucker's" payoffs, a PD only exists if (T+S/2)<R.
Stated another way, if the players do better by alternating between being "suckered" and
"suckering" each other, the game is not a prisoner's dilemma because there is no tension
between working together and competing.
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However, the lessons of the prisoner's dilemma are more obscure in real
life, where noise makes it difficult at times to discern cooperation from
competition, and indeed, where context may matter more than incentives.38
5. Limitations
Rationality, in the strict, old-school sense of a robotic and effective
utility maximizer, has fallen off its pedestal. Critics are now more prominent
than proponents. For example, prolific law scholars such as Cass Sunstein
have become champions of this new approach to law and economics. 39 This
newer approach considers that the rationality assumption needs to be
reconsidered and revised to accommodate the understanding gleaned from
hundreds of observed deviations from classical rationality.40 This new field
called "Behavioral Law and Economics" has resulted in a plethora of books
and articles, and even a new section in the Association of American Law
Schools.41 According to Professor Richard Epstein, "[t]here is little doubt
that the major new theoretical approach to law and economics in the past two
decades does not come from either of these two fields. Instead it comes from
the adjacent discipline of cognitive psychology, which has now morphed into
behavioral economics."42
Whether behavioral law and economics and the relaxation of the
rationality assumption leads to significant advances in our understanding of
conflict is uncertain. But the existence of the new hybrid field stands as
evidence of both the value and limitations of economics as an exclusive or
38 See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Narve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for
Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S.
Reed et al., eds., 1996).
39 See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
40 RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL EcoNoMics (1991).
41 Id.; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROViNG DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Christine Jolls
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1991);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1053 (2000); Thomas
S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747
(1998); The Association of American Law Schools, Section on Socio-Economics,
https://memberaccess.aals.org/eWeb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=ChpDetail&chpcst-k
ey-fba7ea6a-79e6-4e32-bd3b-fc67251cfc86 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
42 Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 803, 803 (2008).
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complete model of decisionmaking.43 Even Coase has been subjected to
analysis by behaviorally-oriented lawyers, and the clear result of this analysis
is that a formerly economically-oriented model of decisionmaking has
become one in which psychology plays a prominent, if not dominant role.
The Nobel Prize in Economics won by psychologist Daniel Kahneman in
2002 signifies the importance of psychology to economic decisionmaking.44
B. Psychological Concepts in Negotiating and Mediating Legal
Claims
Modem scholarly interest in the application of psychology to legal
decisionmaking may have originated with the publication of Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law, in which Professors Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Komhauser discussed how uncertainty, risk attitudes, eclectic preferences,
and party reactions to the behavior of others impacted the settlement of
cases. 45 Professor Mnookin moved the conversation forward when he
founded and directed the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, bringing together psychologists like Amos
Tversky and Lee Ross with economists such as Kenneth Arrow, and
discussing the relevance and application of their work to law and business.
They and their students began an effort that has resulted in thousands of law
review articles built on psychological critiques of conventional doctrinal
analyses of individual cases.46
43 See generally Symposium, Must We Choose Between Rationality and
Irrationality?, 80 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1043 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 41, at 1110; All Laureates in Economics,
http://nobelprize.org/nobeljprizes/economicslaureates (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
45 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
46 My look at how the field of ADR in Law became infused with decisionmaking
goes back only a few years. This history is curt and subject to debate, but in my view, it
happened like this.
As a student, Robert Mnookin studied economics and law, but in his early career as
an academic, he focused on family law-where he must have come to understand the role
of psychology in the dialogue. Later, while a professor at Stanford, he enlisted Arrow,
Ross, Tversky, and Wilson, with occasional help from Janet Alexander and Ian Ayres, to
start the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation and the first serious attempt to
incorporate psychology into legal ADR theory. This all occurred when the Hewlett
Foundation provided funding for academic dispute resolution programs (Harvard's PON
was another beneficiary, as were the Oregon and Ohio Dispute Resolution Commissions).
In the early 1990s, there was money available for organization and support for graduate
study in conflict resolution.
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As an illustration of the robust impact of psychology on law (and perhaps
as a useful organizing tool for dispute resolvers interested in psychology), I
offer the following list of principles that have been studied first by
psychologists, and then adapted over to discussion in law and a few that have
not, to my knowledge, been listed in print before in a law journal, but which
deserve mention.47
The list is divided into two categories meant to describe the general
categories of activities lawyers engage in when preparing cases for
settlement: evaluation and persuasion. While some principles impact both
activities, each is filed by whether it primarily impacts the mind of the
negotiator "in a vacuum" or the negotiator actively involved in the give-and-
take of negotiation. Broadly speaking, the first set of principles is implicated
when putting a value on a claim or choosing a negotiation strategy, and the
second set involves convincing others to accept the correctness of the
evaluation. The descriptions are in my own vernacular-original or
important works are cited for readers who seek less colloquial renditions, as
are examples of where each principle has been discussed in a legal context.
The pinnacle of these efforts may have been Robert Mnookin's work with the other
SCCN members that gave rise to provocative chapters in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995), his speech at the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution Symposium, reflected in Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 235, 242-43 (1993),
and similar work from that period.
The support of SCCN gave rise to writings from a many current professors who
teach negotiation and whose scholarship is rooted in the works of SCCN principal
investigators. These professors include Craig Fox (UCLA business), Chris Guthrie
(Vanderbilt law), Russell Korobkin (one of the most prolific in the area of psychology of
legal decision, now at UCLA law), Jeffrey Rachlinski (Cornell law) and others (I count
myself in or near this cohort). In addition, collaborations between SCCN members and
law professors not traditionally associated with dispute resolution or psychology occurred
on occasion. I am thinking in particular of work produced by Amos Tversky
collaborating with Stanford Law professor Mark Kelman.
Now the work of great cognitive and behavioral psychologists is so widespread that
it is difficult to imagine that in the 1980's, prior to the formation of the SCCN, there was
virtually nothing in the legal literature on dispute resolution and psychology. For
example, a December 10, 2009 Westlaw search in the "JLR" (Journals and Law Reviews)
database for "Tversky" yields 1,934 documents.
47 The list that follows is an extension of a project started in the mid-1990s and
continues today. The first list of principles I published may be found in Richard Birke &
Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1999), and in Richard Birke, Settlement Psychology: When Decision
Making Processes Fail, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 212, 212-18
(2000).
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1. Psychological Principles Associated with Evaluation
* Naive Realism and Biased Assimilation: People believe that they
"see the world as it is," and this causes them to overweigh
information that confirms pre-existing hypotheses, and underweigh
disconfirming information. 48
* Confirmation Bias: People look for information that buttresses
preexisting hypotheses in places likely to produce it.49
* Certainty and Possibility (Psychophysics of Chance):
Decisionmakers value the changes from impossibility to possibility,
or from high likelihood to certainty, far more than equivalent
changes in probability elsewhere on the certainty continuum.50
* False Uncertainty (Psychophysics of Chance): People hesitate to
make decisions when awaiting the outcome of a preliminary event,
even where that preliminary event is irrelevant to the decision.5'
* Focal Points: People are drawn to insignificant deal points if those
points can be made sufficiently salient or focal. 52
* Availability: People fail to differentiate adequately their case from
notorious cases. 53
* Anchoring: People get stuck on salient, irrelevant numbers. 54
48 See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY AND
Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 29.
49 Lord, supra note 48.
50 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 5; Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox,
Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 269 (1995); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representations of
Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
51 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 22-23.
52 THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (Harvard Univ. Press 1981)
(1960).
53 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 8; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIvE PSYCHOL.
207, 208 (1973).
54 Birke & Fox, supra note 47; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 26, at 3, 14-18.
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* Base Rate Neglect: People over-rely on misleading pieces of
information that happen to be particularly salient, and they
undervalue objective, collected data about similar cases.55
* Ellsberg's Paradox: People prefer known risks to unknown risks,
even when that preference yields worse results.56
* Temporal Nature of Preferences: Future forecasts of preferences are
poorly aligned with present desires. 57
* Illusion of Control: People believe that their contribution to an
activity is valuable even when it is not.58
* Positive Illusions: People believe that their contribution is more
valuable than it actually is. 59
* Optimistic Overconfidence: People assess uncertainty levels
optimistically. 60
* False Consensus Bias (Projection): People believe that others think
the way they do or have values similar to their own.61
55 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80
PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973).
56 Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECoN. 643
(1961).
57 DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006).
58 See Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The Illusion of
Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 951, 951-53 (1975).
59 SHELLY E. TAYLOR, POSIflVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE
HEALTHY MIND 32-34 (1989); Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 14.
60 David A. Armour & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
44-46 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
61 Lee Ross et al., The "False Consensus Effect": An Egocentric Bias in Social
Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977).
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* The Endowment Effect: A thing possessed becomes more valuable to
the holder than to the market.62
* Fixed Pie Bias: People tend to view situations as "zero-sum." 63
* Irrational Escalation: Sunk costs compel continued funding of losing
struggles.64
* Mental Accounting: Arbitrary mental divisions of fungible assets
into categories constrain the frontier of available utility. 65
* Perspective Bias: People evaluate information in accordance with
partisan roles.66
2. Psychological Principles Associated with Persuasion
* Reactive Devaluation: (a) Things that are offered are less valuable
than things that are not offered; (b) Offers from an opponent are
evaluated according to the status of the offeree relative to the
offeror. 67
62 Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1325, 1326 (1990); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy
Casefor Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2471 (2001).
63 Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation: Limitations to
Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 51, 62-63 (1983);
Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 30.
6 See, e.g., Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 23; Martin Shubik, The Dollar Auction
Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
109, 109-11 (1971).
65 Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of
Rationality, 80 CI.-KENT L. REv. 1151, 1159 (2005); Richard H. Thaler, Mental
Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999).
66 Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REv. 1337 (1995); Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 14; Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the
Evaluation of One-Sided Evidence, 9 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 59 (1996); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric
Interpretations of Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM.
DECISION PROC. 176 (1992),
67 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 48; Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation
and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27, 29 (Kenneth J.
Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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* Fundamental Attribution Error: We react to situations while others
act in accordance with immutable character traits.68
* Reciprocation of Concessions: People feel obliged to reciprocate for
acts of goodwill, even if the act produces no value and was not
requested or wanted.69
* Rejection of Offers and Later Cognitive Dissonance (Commitment
Biag: It is harder to say "yes" if you have already said "no."70
* Authority: Perceived authority causes changes in decisionmaking
leading to compliance. 71
* Scarcity or Deadlines: Fleeting offers or disappearing commodities
seem more valuable than if they were plentiful or available on
request.72
* Fairness as a Decisionmaking Criterion: People reject deals that
leave them better off than no deal if they perceive that their norms of
fairness are being violated in accepting the deal.73
* Construal Biases: People think that others hold more extreme views
than they do, and are unwilling to accept that others are generally
moderates in a partisan situation.74
68 SUSAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67-86 (2d ed. 1991);
Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 173, 183 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.,
1977); Jonathan Todres, Law, Otherness and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 605, 610 (2009).
69 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 17-56 (4th ed. 2001);
Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 51.
70 CIALDINI, supra note 69, at 67-75; Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 52.
71 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE To AUTHORITY (1983); PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO ET
AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE (1991); Birke &
Fox, supra note 47, at 55.
72 CIALDINI, supra note 16, at ch. 7; Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 56.
73 Werner Glth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982); Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 34-35.
74 Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 3, 10-19 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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* Inertia of Preferences: People will fail to take simple steps to further
their interests if there is a preexisting decision methodology that
offers a second best alternative.75
* Liking: People really do say "yes" more to people they like.76
* Social Proof: If everyone is doing it, it must be okay. 77
* Risk Aversion: People are risk avoiding in the face of gains.78
* Loss Aversion: People are risk seeking in the face of losses.79
* Framing/Prospect Theory: Many equivalent deals are accepted or
rejected depending on the framing of the offer as opposed to the
value of the offer.80
* Concession Aversion (status quo bias): People do not value equal
trades from a neutral perspective. They distort the value of the offer
so as to overvalue the loss, making equal trades difficult to
effectuate. 81
For the practicing negotiator or mediator, cognitive and behavioral
psychology suffer from their own success. Psychological principles are
typically individually documented-indeed, it is critical to the success of an
experiment that a single principle be isolated, lest the experiment yield
ambiguous hypotheses about the result. As a result, relatively little is known
about which principles will trump other principles when a negotiation
situation triggers more than one psychological principle-a much more
typical result than a situation in which only one psychological principle is
7 Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998).
76 CIALDiNI, supra note 69; Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 54.
77 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 54.
78 Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, 22
ECONOMETRICA 23 (Louise Sommer trans., 1954) (1738); Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at
43.
7 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 43.
80 Birke & Fox, supra note 47, at 44; Kahneman et al., Prospect Theory: An
Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
81 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REv. 608 (1998).
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activated. For example, in an offer to settle a lawsuit, will the availability
heuristic inform our estimate of the true value of settlement, or will that
amount be the product of loss aversion? As lawyers engage in the rich
subjects of evaluation of a claim and persuasion of others, the body of
psychological literature yields contradictory advice about such matters as
whether to make the first offer (anchoring), or to wait (create a focal point by
splitting the difference).
* Psychologists have done more than merely poke holes in the economic
model by demonstrating the obvious shortcomings of too strictly rational a
model. They have done substantial work mapping out a "limited rationality"
decisionmaking landscape. However, the mapping effort is incomplete and
individual principles are rarely encountered in isolation. The absence of
knowledge about hierarchy and interplay among psychological factors limits
a negotiator or mediator's ability to apply psychological explanations to all
decisionmaking behavior.
Could it be that neuroscience could provide answers where economics,
self-study, and psychology cannot?
III. THE SCIENCE OF NEUROSCIENCE
In order to understand how new neuroscience may impact decision
theory, it is necessary to have at least a rudimentary understanding of the
study of the brain. In this section, I will offer the lightest treatment I can of
the relevant subject matter, and refer to thorough but approachable. texts for
deeper understanding.
A. A Brief View of the Early Days of Brain Study-Injuries and
Animals
Much of the early study of the brain was based in what is now
recognized as nonsense. Phrenology and the reading of bumps were preceded
by barbaric surgeries performed on the mentally ill and on belief that the
"humours" inhabited the brain. But along the way, someone had an accident
that destroyed part of his brain, and doctors made note of behavioral changes.
In this way, particular regions of the brain became correlated with particular
behaviors and deficits.
Perhaps the most famous of these poor souls is Phineas Gage, who, while
working on a railroad, had an iron bar rammed by an explosion through the
bottom of his jaw, through his brain, and out the top of his skull. Gage
survived, but according to friends, he was a different person. Formerly
reserved, he swore in public and behaved in socially inappropriate ways. He
498
[Vol. 25:2 2010]
SCIENTIFIC INNOVATIONS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
is now known to have damaged medial and orbital regions of his prefrontal
cortex. 82 As a result of the prevalence of injuries like Gage's, a rather
sophisticated form of brain mapping has occurred.83
Animal study has also helped scientists understand the brain, but various
prohibitions and inhibitions have rendered the scientific record less rich than
might have been expected. Early scientists were not persuaded that human
brains and animal brains shared sufficient characteristics to make study
worthwhile, and in various periods, experimentation on animals was
considered immoral and distasteful.84
B. Today's Alphabet Soup-PET, TMS, EEG andfMR1s5
Some of the first modem neuroimaging studies occurred through
positron emission tomography (PET), in which a radioactive tracer is injected
into the subjects. Researchers can then isolate those parts of the brain
associated with various activities, like moving a hand or recognizing a face.
However, PET scans are slow and expensive, and thus their application has
been limited.86
Electroencepholagram (EEG) and magnetoencepholagram (MEG)
technologies measure electrical impulses in the brain. Typically, a substantial
piece of rubberized headgear studded thoroughly with electrodes is applied to
82 The Phineas Gage story is one of the most common stories encountered in this
field. This version was inspired by the retelling by Michael S. Gazzaniga and Megan S.
Steven, in Free Will in the 21s' Century, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland
ed., 2004).
83 Such injuries are categorized under the catch-all name "lesions," which seems to
be a rather mild sounding word when applied to accident-induced lobotomies and the
like. Id.; Scorr A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 452
(2d ed. 2009) ("To this end, several groups around the world have established large
databases, or registries, of individuals who have brain lesions and who have been studied
while performing large numbers of different tasks.").
84 IACABONI, supra note 3. For a mole thorough discussion of the early pioneers in
brain science, see STANLEY FINGER, ORIGINS OF NEUROSCIENCE: A HISTORY OF
EXPLORATIONS INTO BRAIN FUNCTION (2001); see also STANLEY FINGER, MINDS BEHIND
THE BRAIN: A HISTORY OF THE PIONEERS AND THEIR DISCOvERIES (2000). For an example
of monkeys being subjected to the same "lesion" that Phineas Gage suffered, see DREW
WESTEN, supra note 3, at 57.
85 For a terrific quick look at fMRI in use, see
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/mrilMM00395. For information on EEG machines,
see http://www.eeginfo.com/what-is-neurofeedback.htm. For a video demonstration of a
PET scan, see http://videos.howstuffworks.com/multi-media-productions/1 185-pet-scan-
imaging-advances-video.htm.
86 HUETTEL, supra note 83, at 4.
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a subject whose head has been prepared with a coating of conductive gel
solution. The subject is then exposed to stimuli and his reactions, and
perhaps decisions, are recorded in perfect time synchrony with electrical
signals emitted from various areas of the brain. EEG and MEG measure what
are called Event Related Potentials, or ERPs, and are related to either
cognitive or sensory processing.87
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) disables part of the brain with
a powerful and focused magnetic pulse applied by holding an
electromagnetic "paddle" somewhat smaller than a table tennis racket near
the skull of the subject. This pulse can be a single brief pulse or a series of
tiny pulses over several minutes, called rTMS.88 TMS makes it is possible to
study in a noninvasive manner the behavioral deficits created by the
disability. This device allows scientists to replicate injury for purposes of
crafting treatments, and it allows some intelligent speculation about the
primary function of the disabled area. Exploration of Broca's area and
Wernecke's region are prime examples of the usefulness of TMS.89
Perhaps the uncontested champion of brain research is the functional
magnetic resonance imager, or fMRI. The fMRI measures changes in the
oxygen levels in more active parts of the brain by inducing a series of
magnetic pulses tuned to the frequency of hydrogen nuclei. The energy
absorbed and emitted by the nuclei may be measured and recorded.90 Thus, if
stimulation in the form of a question, picture, or situation activates part of the
brain, and that part of the brain draws more oxygen than when idle, the fMRI
can measure which parts of the brain become active under which conditions.
The full potential of this ability has barely begun to be mined. "In barely 15
years, fMRI has grown from a theoretical concept to become the dominant
technique in cognitive neuroscience." 91
All of the technologies yield great insights, but are limited. None takes a
picture of an emotion. They capture electrical impulses, magnetic responses,
and the like. While miraculous, these machines and techniques yield data that
requires a great deal of extrapolation. However, despite these limitations,
there are now enough studies to begin in earnest the process of applying the
most relevant data to the settlement of legal disputes.
8 7 Id. at 314.
8 8 Id. at 450-52.
89 For an instructive and short video in which Broca's area is temporarily impaired
in a subject, see http://technorati.com/videos/youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D67HMx-
TdAZI.
90 HUETTEL, supra note 83, at 3.
91 Id.
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IV. NEUROSCIENTIFIC STUDIES APPLIED TO AN OFF-THE-RACK
MEDIATION
In an effort to illustrate the potential importance of the fMRI and other
brain science to the process of negotiating or mediating a settlement, I will
now describe ways in which some recent findings in neuroscience might
apply to some situations common in a generic mediation process.92 In this
template, parties first gather for a joint session in which the mediator makes
an opening statement and the parties, directly or through their lawyer, are
then encouraged to relate their side of the story to the mediator. The mediator
then seeks to eliminate misunderstandings, often by shuttling back and forth
between rooms. The mediator encourages the parties to stop looking
backward and become future-oriented. The mediator encourages the parties
to think about options, make and react to offers, and consider how various
offers compare to their litigation alternative. If the parties are stuck or at
impasse, the mediator may look for creative ways to attempt to bridge any
remaining gap. In some instances, if the parties are unable to bridge the gap,
the mediator might make a proposal for the parties to consider.93
This deceptively simple process is filled with process questions for the
mediator. At the beginning, should the parties be in the same room? After all,
they are adversaries in a lawsuit, and there may be hard feelings between
them. Perhaps the parties are thoroughly familiar with the other side's legal
theory and factual beliefs. What good is it to keep the parties in the same
92 Mediation is not necessarily a preferred mode of analysis to negotiation, but is
amenable to a more standardized template. It should not take much imagination to
translate the neuroscience from mediation to negotiation. While mediation varies
considerably from practitioner to practitioner and from dispute to dispute, I use a
template that is widespread, if not universally endorsed.
93 With the exception of the mediator's offer (which is sometimes left out), the
stages described above have been overtly discussed in every class or training I have
offered, attended, read about, or discussed with a colleague. I suggest that the process I
have described is the current "standard form mediation." For academic descriptions, see
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (2002); see also Arbitration &
Mediation, http://www.statelawyers.com/Practice/PracticeDetail.cfm/PracticeTypelD
(last visited Nov. 25, 2009); Jessica A. Stepp, How Does The Mediation Process Work?,
MEDIATE.COM, Feb. 2003, http://www.mediate.com/articles/steppJ.cfin; Census
Mediation Program, http://www.census.gov/adr/mediation_process.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2009); Understanding the Child Custody Mediation Process-Lawyers.com,
http://family-law.lawyers.com/child-custody/Understanding-the-Child-Custody-
Mediation-Process.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2009); Accident Claims Law-Mediation,
http://www.accidentclaimslaw.com/htmil/mediation.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
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room for yet another recitation of the facts and law? Perhaps this is why
many mediations quickly break into caucus.
Should the parties be encouraged to tell their stories? Mediators assume
there is a cathartic effect when a party has the opportunity to tell their side of
the story without interruption or objection. The parties can say whatever they
want, without regard to relevance or materiality. They can bring their
emotions into play. Conventional wisdom suggests that once the parties have
"blown off a little steam," they are clearer minded and can approach
settlement in a calmer light. Is this accurate? Is it productive to invite parties
first to vent, then to bargain?
Similar questions pervade the mediation process to the end. When a
mediation is about to break down, should a mediator suggest a settlement?
Should she advocate for her settlement, or if the parties resist, should the
mediator play a more passive role?
The remainder of this section of this article consists of a set of phases in
a typical mediation, arranged in chronological order. Neuroscientific studies
relevant to the activities associated with each phase are first described and
then used as the basis for extrapolations from scientific research to mediation
techniques.
A. Phase One-The Opening Statement: Mirror Neurons &
Universal Facial Expression
In the first phase of mediation, the mediator typically introduces himself,
goes over the ground rules for the mediation, and discusses the plan for the
mediation. Lawyers and parties may or may not make opening statements.
While some mediators support the idea of long joint sessions, and some
advocate for a no-caucus model, these mediators appear to be in the minority,
as most active mediators prefer the simplicity, comfort, and confidentiality of
a short opening and a quick move to caucus.94 In fact, a sizable number of
mediators hold only cursory opening statements in which the parties do not
speak and the lawyers speak minimally if at all. This may be a terrible
tactical choice.
94 See, e.g., Christopher W. Moore, The Caucus: Private Meetings That Promote
Settlement, 16 MEDIATION Q. 87, 88-90 (1987). When I entered the phrase "no-caucus"
in the same sentence as "mediation" in a Westlaw search, it returned three results. When I
entered "caucus" in the same sentence as "mediation," it returned 654. I have not read
them all, but a cursory review shows that they tend to be about how to caucus effectively
and why one ought to use caucuses, with only scant reference to the idea of not
caucusing.
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In his book Mirroring People, Dr. Marco lacaboni describes the
discovery and understanding of a "mirror neuron."95 These neurons were
discovered in macaque monkeys in a lab in Italy in the 1990S.96 Researchers
who were studying an area of the brain known as F-5 knew it was related to
hand movement. They were interested in learning how human patients with
various disorders might be coached to have more manual dexterity.
Scientists noticed that the monitors on the F-5 section of the monkeys'
brains were activated even when the monkeys were not moving. They
figured out that the brain activity of the monkeys corresponded to
movements the monkeys observed the scientists performing. The monkeys
were mirroring in their brains what they saw another primate doing.97
Brain scans of the monkeys revealed that the monkey's neurons act in a
virtually identical manner whether the monkey is eating a banana or
observing another monkey eat a banana. The monkey's brain experiences the
act of eating even though it is not.98
lacaboni spends much of his book persuading the reader that humans, not
just monkeys, are hard-wired for empathy.99 He notes similarities between
the gyri and sulci (bumps and grooves) of the macaque brain and the human
brain, and offers illustrations of the likely correlations between the macaque
brains and ours. 00 He concludes that humans use mirror neurons for
empathy, language, and self-awareness.' 0 '
If we have mirror neurons, does that mean we can use empathic ability to
read others accurately? This would depend on a finding that humans speak in
a universal emotional language. It appears that they do.
As a young scientist in the 1950's, Paul Ekman traveled the world
photographing faces of people from various cultures and showing those
photographs to members of other cultures.102 Ekman made a point of
traveling to cultures that were as primitive and unexposed to Western culture
95 IACABONI, supra note 3, at 4.
96 The lab was operated by Dr. Giacomo Rizzolatti. Id. at 8.
9 71 Id. at 10.
9 8 Id. at 14-15.
99 Building on and paralleling the research on monkeys, brain imaging and magnetic
stimulation data on humans have revealed a mirror neuron system that fulfills the
same functions as it does in monkeys.. . . Human mirror neuron areas seem
important for empathy, self-awareness and language.
Id. at 260.
100 IACABONI, supra note 3, at 62.
101 Id. at 281.
102 PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS To
IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE 1 (2003).
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as possible.10 3 Through his research, he discovered that facial expressions
were universal. 104
A native of Papua New Guinea shown a picture of a Caucasian San
Franciscan woman could readily identify the expression of disgust, anger, or
fear in her face. The ability to distinguish even small expressions was
surprisingly unconnected with culture. Nature, not nurture, controlled in this
instance.
Ekman concluded that the universality of facial expression had
evolutionary advantages. The ability to communicate without words certainly
must have been an advantage among creatures with a limited or non-existent
spoken language. Moreover, given that members of different tribal
communities who did not have a common language had a need to interact-
at least to determine who was friend and who was foe-those who could
more credibly express their peaceable intent and those who could more
accurately gauge the intent of others were more likely to reproduce than
those with lesser skills.105
Ekman further found that babies born blind make the same facial
expressions as the sighted do. This remarkable discovery cemented the idea
that facial expressions are innate.
Ekman more recently has asserted that certain facial muscles are only
accessible if a certain pattern of brain activity accompanies the movement-
that is, there are "tell tale" expressions that can only be made when the
associated feeling is genuine. For example, while one can "scrunch" the
forehead's central muscle to mimic concern, even when not feeling
particularly concerned, most people lack the ability to move their eyebrows
into a certain position unless they are truly sad.106
Ekman's theories are not strictly for the laboratory. They are making
their way into everything from trial analysis to airport security. In his book,
Telling Lies, Ekman describes his techniques as adapted over to the activity
of lie detection. Videos available on the internet show Ekman discussing his
103 Id
104 Actually, Ekman gives the credit for the discovery to Darwin. Ekman may
properly be said to have proved universality to the satisfaction of the scientific
community, where Darwin's speculation was just that. Id. at 2, 14.
105 For an interesting discussion of how people sometimes identify with each other
and sometimes against each other, see DAVID BERREBY, Us AND THEM: UNDERSTANDING
YOUR TRIBAL MIND (2005). The book is, like so many cited in this article, full of insights
derived from neuroscience.
106 This muscle is referred to by Darwin as the "grief muscle." EKMAN, supra note
102, at 100. Apparently, Woody Allen and Jim Carrey are exceptions to this rule. Id. at
103.
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work and dissecting the testimony of Kato Kaelin in the widely broadcast
case People v OJ Simpson.'0 7 Ekman's lie detection techniques are now used
by the Transportation Safety Authority to help detect suspicious activity. 0 8
Taken together, the ideas of universal expression and mirror neurons
suggest that humans have been bred by our environment to a species-constant
learning and that humans have physical characteristics that include mirror
neurons and particular muscles that lead to particular communicative
expressions that are readily understood by other members of the species. This
idea that humans can read others leads to a variety of hypotheses that might
militate toward longer joint sessions in mediation, or more face-to-face
contact with opposing negotiators.
Many a high-minded, honest negotiator has found out that it is very hard
to persuade an opponent of one's own sincerity. 0 9 More face-to-face contact
in dispute resolution might offer the opportunity to demonstrate sincerity in
an emotionally convincing manner. It may also offer the opportunity to
assess credibility of the opponent---client or lawyer.
President George W. Bush made famous his experience of looking into
Vladimir Putin's eyes and getting a "sense of his soul."1lo While that
statement may have been the subject of some later ridicule, the fact that he
said it and people readily understood the activity (if they did not necessarily
agree with the conclusion) demonstrates the broad understanding that people
are entitled to rely on judgments about the intent of others merely by
107 People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Los Angeles
County, Oct. 13, 1995). For a video of Ekman dissecting Kaelin's testimony, see
http://www.paulekman.com/about-ekman/.
108 See Thomas Mydans, Security Arsenal Adds Behavior Detection: Controversial
Technique Targets 'Suspicious' People, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2007, at IB ("[T]he
Ekman Group, was paid $1 million to train 1,200 TSA inspectors last month in his
interviewing technique. He proposed a study to Homeland Security researchers to find
behaviors indicating hostile intent among travelers walking around airports."); see also
Clark Freshman, After Basic Mindfulness Meditation: External Mindulness, Emotional
Truthfulness and Lie Detection in Dispute Resolution, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 511.
Professor Freshman at UC Hastings College of Law is one of the few people authorized
to conduct training on lie detection on behalf of Professor Ekman. Michael Wheeler at
Harvard Business School is the only other of which I am aware.
109 EKMAN, supra note 102, at 25; see, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms,
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2261 (1996) ("Sincerity does not ensure
persuasiveness; group members will typically think criticism is mistaken. But the
perception of insincerity nearly guarantees unpersuasiveness, so a critical signal that
other members believe to be sincere is more likely to persuade them.").
110 Caroline Wyatt, Bush and Putin: Best of Friends, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/1392791.stm.
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observing their faces. Parents tell children to "look me in the eye" when they
suspect a child is lying, and they trust their ability to discern a fear of
consequences of the underlying act (e.g., punishment for breaking the vase)
from fear that their prevarication (it must have been the cat) will be
discovered. As a parent, I engage in that method and I believe-perhaps
mistakenly-that I can tell when my children are telling the truth and when
they are not. II
Perhaps neuroscience suggests that mediators let the parties see each
other more. They will be able to tell whether the other side is serious about
settling the case or not. They will be able to tell whether they can trust
information.112
If mirror neurons work and facial expressions give accurate clues to
internal machinations, why avoid joint sessions? Perhaps the party who
wants to mislead prefers the privacy of caucus, and perhaps the mediator
with a good reputation provides a useful tool for an unscrupulous party, but
these are not the reasons parties give for going to caucus. Parties cite
confidential information and bad feelings as reasons to go into caucus, but
mediations conducted in caucus often become exercises in mistrust. The lack
of visual confirmation that words match affect causes listeners to distrust
speakers' intent.
Is it the case that all mediation should be conducted in joint session?
Some say yes, but these are a rare few.11 3 I am not trying to make their case
here, but it is worth noting that neuroscience now offers some empirical
Ill For tips on negotiation with one's offspring, see ScorT DAVIS, How To
NEGOTIATE WITH YOUR KIDS EVEN WHEN You THINK You SHOULDN'T: 7 ESSENTIAL
SKILLS To END CONFLICT AND BRING MORE JOY INTO YOUR FAMILY (2003).
112 In fact, in the training I have done for hundreds of insurance professionals on
mediation, I have heard many times that they want to see the claimant speak in opening
session. They are then able to increase the amount of their offer as a result of their
opinion that the claimant would be a credible witness in front of a jury. These
professionals will be evaluated many months later by a supervisor whose job is to do
closed file reviews. These evaluators are looking for ways to encourage their staff to
settle more economically, sometimes by paying less and other times by paying sooner or
incurring fewer transaction costs. It is rare that an evaluator cannot find something to
second guess, but the claims staff reports to me that they are never second guessed when
they increase an offer based on a face-to-face meeting with the claimant. The adjusters
trust their ability to discern the expected reaction of a juror and the evaluators trust their
adjusters' ability to do that, because they trust their own ability to do that.
113 The leading proponents of a no-caucus model are Gary Friedman and Jack
Himmelstein. See GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT:
MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008).
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insights that might tip the decision in favor of more time spent face-to-face
than is the current norm.
B. Phase Two-Telling the Tale: Fear Networks and the Executive
Function of the Brain
A litigator friend describes his cases as pancakes-some are thin but
there are always two sides. Mediators and negotiators know it is important to
hear both sides of the story, and in most legal disputes, there are more than
two stories. The lawyers have interests and perspectives different than their
clients, and clients may have mixed feelings and conflicting internal visions
about the events that underlay the conflict.
It is sometimes the case that recapitulation of the events that gave rise to
the lawsuit, or the rehearsal of the opponents' behavior during litigation can
cause some emotional reaction on the part of the person telling their side of
the story. Mediators commonly believe this process serves an important
cathartic effect, and once the teller has released all his pent up feelings, he
can start to bargain more rationally.114 If he is bottled up, some of the
emotional content will work its way into the process of making offers and
concessions. Telling the tale will cause relaxation and with it will come a
willingness to bargain.
So goes the conventional wisdom. Neuroscience may suggest otherwise.
Neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux has studied fear responses for much of his
career. His work extends the work on conditioned responses by famed
behaviorist Ivan Pavlov.115 LeDoux describes how Pavlov conditioned
animals to expect pain by simultaneously providing a painful event with an
inconsequential event. The inconsequential event then triggers fear. An
114 See, e.g., NANCY L. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
MEDIATION AND THE LAW 7-39 (1987) ("[In mediation,] parties are provided a forum
where they can vent their feelings while telling their 'stories' so that they feel heard and
understood."); Jim Freund, Three's a Crowd-How to Solve a Knotty Multi-Party
Dispute Through Mediation, 64 Bus. LAW. 359, 368 (2009) ("Usually, at the outset of a
two-party dispute mediation, I put everyone in a large room and let the parties and their
counsel vent about the merits of their respective cases. I do this in part for psychological
reasons: the parties have to feel the mediator has heard their strongest arguments ... .");
Barbara J. Gazeley, Venus, Mars, and the Law: Mediation of Sexual Harassment Cases,
33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 605, 645 (1997) ("Each side needs to feel heard and understood
and have their genuine emotions validated, regardless of how they have treated each other
prior to the mediation. This cathartic experience often must occur before the parties can
go of the dispute and work on a pragmatic resolution.").
11s JOSEPH E. LEDoux, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS
OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 141-43 (1998).
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example is the "Skinner Box,"' 16 which typically has an electrified floor and
either a bell or a light. In the experiment, a rat is placed in the box, and then
the bell rings or the light comes on, and almost immediately, the floor is
electrified, resulting in the rat receiving a painful shock. This protocol is
repeated several times. Then the bell rings or the light comes on and the floor
is not electrified. However, the rat reacts with the same fear response as if the
floor had administered a shock. The floor is the direct stimulus and the bell
or light is a conditioned stimulus, but the response is the same. From Pavlov
and Skinner, we know the behavioral manifestations of conditioned fear.
Now, neuroscience reveals the physical manifestations, and they are found in
the telephone lines of the brain-neural pathways.
A particular neuron among the billions of neurons in the brain can fire-
that is, release a chemical-to a number of nearby neurons. Neurons seem to
have a choice of which nearby neurons they will "talk" to.117 Once a chain
reaction from one neuron to a distant other is complete, we have what is
called a neural network. While there are billions of neurons in a brain, the
number of possible neural networks is exponentially larger. There are more
potential networks than a person could experience in a lifetime. 118
Once a pair of neurons has fired in communication one to the other, they
have subtly realigned, and for a time, subsequent realignment is easier. If
pathways fire with enough duration or intensity, the neural network is said to
be more durable. Pathways that fire with great frequency (e.g., the pathways
between the eyes and hands) are quite durable and repeating patterns helps
facilitate expertise in typing or playing piano. Pathways that are highly vivid
are also readily reassembled, so a well-executed surprise birthday party may
be readily recalled-feelings and emotions and smells and all-for many
years after the event, and perhaps for life.
LeDoux found that the neurological pathways created by fear are among
the most durable of all neural networks.11 9 Fear, as one of the most
successful evolutionary strategies,120 is ingrained very deeply in the brain.
Mice who have never encountered a cat have not learned to be afraid of cats;
yet the first time they are placed in the presence of a cat, they show all the
116 A good schematic and explanation of a Skinner Box may be found at
http://brembs.net/operant/skinnerbox.html; see also LEDoux, supra note 115, at 150.
117 LEDoUX, supra note 115, at 139.
118 Indeed, one of the measures of child development-the pruning of useless
information from memory-is now thought to be the release of neurons from networks
once thought to be of potential value.
119 LEDoux, supra note 115, at 145 ("Not only is fear conditioning quick, it is long
very long lasting.").
120 Id. at 143, 147.
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hallmark signals of fear-the freeze/fight/flight response pattern. There are
also anecdotal reports of infants exhibiting a "startle response" to images of
snakes and spiders, and there is little doubt about the existence of
conditioned fear in humans.121
Once a conditioned fear response becomes associated with a natural
fear-the sound of screeching brakes becomes associated with prior
experiences of being struck by something, falling down, or otherwise
sustaining traumatic physical injury-the conditioned response produces re-
traumatization. The neural pathways associated with the fear response are
readily re-engaged. Pavlov called this "spontaneous recovery."' 22
In fact, once a fear pathway is created, it is unlikely to disappear or even
diminish in its intensity. Perhaps this is why we may experience moments of
childlike fear about something that we thought we long ago had resolved. A
smell or an image might trigger a set of emotions in the "feeler" that seem
disconnected from the environmental circumstances in which the feeler finds
herself.
Fear changes over time, but through a process of extinction. Take the
example of a rabbit that visits a watering hole. On one visit, a fox appears.
From then on, the watering hole will trigger a "fear of the fox" response,
even in the absence of the fox. The only way that the rabbit overcomes that
fear is by experiencing enough post-scare visits to the watering hole without
encountering the fox.123 "Getting right back on the horse" is the best
approach, not because it diminishes the fear, but rather because it creates a
set of competing neural pathways that might trump the durable fear network.
LeDoux then turned to direct study of the brain through chemical tracers
inserted near the origin of a particular fear stimulus. In this case, sound was
the stimulus and the aural networks were implicated.124 LeDoux found that
fear traveled two paths-one directly to the body (the "low road") and one
that was mediated by the amygdala (the "high road").125 LeDoux found that
the low road was faster-by the time the "mind" knew it was afraid, blood
had already reached the legs. Therefore, it might seem that knowledge of fear
is redundant. However, this is why the high road is important. It leads to the
possibility of cognition about fear.126
121 Id. at 146-47.
122 Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
123 Id. at 145.
124 LEDouX, supra note 115, at 156 (showing the location of the tracers in the
neuronal path).
125 Id. at 164.
126 Id. at 175.
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Turning then to mediation, one must question whether it takes sense to
ask the parties to recapitulate the story that leads to the hard feelings that lead
to the lawsuit. There are certainly reasons to be cautious. In criminal law,
there is much discussion about the revictimizing effect of putting a victim on
the witness stand to be forced to recount the events underlying the criminal
case. 127 There is every reason to believe that a person who retells in detail an
event that is painful or traumatic fully relives that trauma in their neurons.
However, failure to adequately discuss the underlying emotional aspects
of a lawsuit often results in the missed opportunity to discover the underlying
interests of the parties. In a case that is driven by a mix of emotions and more
tangible damages-for example, a retaliatory discharge claim-a plaintiff
might ask for money to address lost wages but may also be asking for
additional money that addresses her anger over the incident, or her fear that
she may not be readily employable elsewhere. If these feelings of fear can be
explored, it may be possible to address the fears in some way other than
purely through financial compensation.128 However, if the feelings are not
allowed to surface, the only means of communication may be the exchange
of money offers. Many mediations turn on a search for valuable non-
monetary concessions that meet claimants' interests.
Moreover, strong anecdotal evidence suggests that parties in mediation
take great satisfaction in telling their story, uninterrupted by objections or
exhortations to "only discuss what is legally relevant." Telling the tale may
reignite neural fear networks, but settling a dispute without acknowledging
the emotional "elephant in the room" may feel hollow or incomplete. On
balance, perhaps the right thing to do is to get the party to tell the tale and
relive the painful experience. But what next?
Research on an area of the brain known as the "executive" suggests that
when executive functions are impaired, the brain tends to be more reactive
127 See, e.g., William Wesley Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims: An
Empirical Rebuttal to the Open Juvenile Dependency Court Reform Movement, 38
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 303 (2005).
128 For an example of this sentiment in a discussion about toxic torts, see D. Alan
Rudlin and William P. Childress, Case Management and Health Claims in Toxic Tort
Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT LITIGATION (2008) ("In preparation for
settlement authority for the mediation, it is useful for each side to think of possible non-
monetary options that may be available."). For an example discussing an employment
law setting, see Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation:
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Non-Adversarial Setting,
14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 269, 342 (1999) ("Mediation offers parties an opportunity
to voice their requests for nonmonetary relief that their attorneys may not have
emphasized.").
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than active. 129 What are these executive functions? The current research
about this area suggests that humans take in new data in what is now called
"working memory," formerly called "short term memory." The average brain
can hold about seven pieces of new data before there is a sharp drop-off in
executive function-hence seven digit phone numbers, seven deadly sins,
seven habits of highly successful people, etc. 130 The executive takes the data
and compares it to stored data in the brain. We recognize a word based on
past experience with that word. We duck when an object is flying toward our
head because of some primal knowledge embedded in our genetic makeup.
However, when the executive compares the items in the in-tray to the
items in storage, and the most ready comparison comes accompanied by an
emotional tidal wave, the executive is overwhelmed and instinctive reactions
dominate thoughtful reactions. In other words, the flooded executive is less
able to consider new options for action. It will rely on freeze/fight/flight.
This is not the best place for a party to be in a mediation. It would be better
for the party to engage in a broader brainstorming session so that underlying
interests could give rise to creative options.
What does this mean for the mediator? Perhaps it means that after a party
tells a re-traumatizing tale, they need a substantial cool-down period before
they are ready to bargain. The notion that a party should "get it all out" and
then they are ready to bargain is accurate to a degree. They are ready to
bargain after they get it all out, but not right away. I suggest that after a party
experiences the trauma/catharsis of telling their story, it is a very good time
for a coffee or lunch break, and it may even be the case in some disputes that
it is a good place to end for the day.
If a break is not possible, one technique to consider when faced with a
party who seems to be emotionally flooded is to call to that party's attention
to his own breathing. Mindful breathing is one of the most commonly
129 For a useful and short definition, see Executive Function, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Del-Fi/Executive-function.html
(last visited Nov. 27, 2009).
The term executive function describes a set of cognitive abilities that control
and regulate other abilities and behaviors. Executive functions are necessary for
goal-directed behavior. They include the ability to initiate and stop actions, to
monitor and change behavior as needed, and to plan future behavior when faced
with novel tasks and situations. Executive functions allow us to anticipate outcomes
and adapt to changing situations. The ability to form concepts and think abstractly
are often considered components of executive function.
Id.
130 See George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 81 (1956).
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practiced meditation techniques in the world, and it exists in and outside of
many religious, spiritual, and physical practices. Breathing is, by its nature, a
present tense activity, and concentration on breathing helps the executive
hear and respond to new information and offers less reactively.131
C. Phase Three-Passing Information: Confirmation Bias &
Reaction Devaluation in the fMRI
It is well known and well proven that we do not hear information with
neutral ears. One aspect of a phenomenon named "reactive devaluation" is
that the recipient of an offer devalues offers from opponents and the recipient
will treat the same offer more favorably when offered by a neutral. 132 This
may be one reason mediation is effective after direct negotiations have
broken down.
Another aspect of reactive devaluation is that we discount the value of
things offered merely because they have been offered. This is clearly related
to principles about scarcity-the less available something is, the more
attractive it is-and the same item that we discount when offered is more
attractive if held back or part of a menu of options.
Two additional principles exacerbate the bias created by reactive
devaluation, namely confirmation bias and biases of assimilation. When we
look for data and look at the data we find, we do so in biased ways. We sort
data into two basic categories-supportive of our ideas or challenging to our
ideas. In addition, we sort based on perspective, with a strong bias toward
retaining and strengthening preexisting views. 133 If data support our belief,
we think that data very important. If data contradict our belief, we think that
the data are distinguishable and of lesser importance. If data are neutral, it is
often because the data are mixed-a little good for us, a little good for
them-and we find the parts that are good for us more persuasive than the
parts that are good for them.134
We look for data in places that are unconsciously calculated to provide
us the answers we seek. It has long been established that we unconsciously
131 Paul Ekman endorses the practice as benefiting "emotional behavior awareness"
and "impulse awareness." EKMAN, supra note 102, at 238-39. Daniel J. Siegel devotes
parts of at least six chapters of Mindful Brain to the topic, including a "how to." DANIEL
J. SIEGEL, MINDFUL BRAIN: THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF WELL-BEING (2008); see also James
Shreeve, Beyond the Brain, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 2005, available at http://science.na
tionalgeographic.com/science/health-and-human-body/human-body/mind-brain.html.
132 Ross, supra note 67, at 29.
133 See supra pp. 33-37.
134 See, e.g., Lord et al., supra note 48.
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frame questions and seek information in ways and from places that create an
evidence cache that is already sorted (or distorted) in our favor. This set of
biases drives a great deal of the overconfidence in bargaining.
In his book, The Political Brain, Emory University psychology professor
Drew Westen describes an fMRI study of political beliefs which appears to
merely corroborate the principles described in the preceding few paragraphs.
Westen and his colleagues, Dr. Stephan Hammann and Clint Kilts, gave
members of each major political party dissonant information that was
inconsistent with their preexisting beliefs. Specifically, Republicans looked
at slides containing negative information about Republicans and positive
information about Democrats. For Democrats, the test was the same, but the
information that positive for Republicans and negative for Democrats. 135
Westen expected to find that threatening information would activate
neural networks associated with negative emotional states; that the
information would activate parts of the brain associated with emotional
regulation; that the brains studied would be "brains in conflict" between what
they wanted to believed and what they ought to infer from evidence; and that
subjects would "reason" with the parts of their brain most associated with
"gut instinct" as opposed to those associated with true reasoning.136
It is not surprising that Westen found evidence consistent with reactive
devaluation and confirmation bias. He found that when subjects heard
consonant information, they had a mild reaction-no emotional flare-ups and
no long enduring feelings. When subjects heard dissonant information, the
brain scans showed evidence of hotter, more durable responses.137 "When
confronted with potentially troubling political information, a network of
neurons becomes active that produces distress." 38
However, while reactive devaluation and confirmation bias were well
understood prior to the fIRI, what was not known is what the brain does
when these preferences and bias are manifesting themselves. We like to find
information that lets us feel reassured that we are in control, and we are
distressed to find out that maybe we are not-but why? 39
Westen argues that dissonant information activates the animal side of a
person, while consonant information activates the civilized exterior person.
135 WESTEN, supra note 3, at xii-xiii. For Republicans, the information was a "flip
flop" by President George W. Bush about VA Hospitals and support for veterans' care.
Id. For Democrats, the message was about a "flip-flop" by Senator/Presidential Candidate
John Kerry about support for the invasion of Kuwait in the first Gulf War. Id.
136 Id. at xi.
137 Id. at 52-53.
138 Id. at xiii.
139'See supra pp. 497-99.
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In an effort to make the two selves align, the brain manages to "shut down
distress through faulty reasoning." Moreover, the "neural circuits charged
with the regulation of emotional states" shut down distress quickly and easily
by recruiting "beliefs that eliminated the distress and conflict partisans had
seemed to experience when they confronted unpleasant realities."1 40
Westen was surprised to find that the brain was not "satisfied in just
feeling better. It worked overtime to feel good, activating reward circuits that
give partisans a jolt of positive reinforcement for their biased reasoning."
These circuits overlap with those of drug addicts who get their "fix."
Westen discusses theories of evolutionary biology, concluding that
humans are capable of a form of rational thought that exists primarily in the
most recently evolved parts of the brain, namely the outer cortices, and that
emotional thought occurs in parts of the brain that are older and which
evolved in response to environmental conditions that are no longer as
relevant to our survival. In simple terms, our "gut" is older than our "brain,"
if by gut one refers to the emotional brain and by "brain" one refers to the
cortices. Westen spends much of the remainder of his book showing how
humans are more likely to be guided by impulses from the older emotional
centers than from the newer, and only persistent efforts at activating and
engaging the cortices have any hope at overriding the older, more dominant
mental hardware.
Associated research described by Dr. David Linden in his book, The
Accidental Mind, corroborates Westen's thinking. Linden describes how the
brain weaves coherent, seamless visual pictures from a series of individual
images (known as saccades) in much the same way that a moving picture is
really a series of stills.141 People do not really see smooth images, but only
think they do.142 Linden notes that the "creation of coherent narratives in the
brain is not limited to manipulation of low-level perception as occurs with
visual saccades, but extends to higher perceptual and cognitive levels." 43
Linden describes several "split-brain" studies in which subjects perceive
information with only one of the hemispheres of the brain exposed to an
image and the other hemisphere exposed to a different image.1" When asked
to describe the images, subjects typically weaved together a story that makes
consonant the dissonant images.145
140 WESTEN, supra note 3, at xiv.
141 LINDEN, supra note 3, at 221-34.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 225.
144 Id. at 226-29.
145 Id. 227-28.
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Taken together, Linden's and Westen's work has important implications
for people engaged in settlement. We have an old brain and a newer brain,
and they both contribute to our thinking. When they are in discord, the old
brain usually wins. It was probably the case at some time that discordant
information served as a form of alert for predators, or a method to call
attention to unintended nonconformity with the social order. Something "out
of whack" draws greater attention in the parts of your brain that attend more
to survival than to enlightenment. Behavioral biology teaches us that human
behavior is, in large measure, the product of a more primitive, longer period
of evolutionary history than is the modem age (and certainly the digital age).
Humans are dragging old brains along for a ride into the future. Those old
brains still hear a bus go by and react as if a large animal or pack of animals
were passing.
The newer brain can sometimes observe the dialogue between itself and
the old brain. There can be a conscious internal dialogue in which the new
brain notices the old brain's animal-like reaction to a situation, and by
bringing the mind's attention to the present ("no pack of animals here-just a
bus"), the new brain soothes the old. It is just as easy to conjure scenarios in
which the new brain stirs the old brain up. In 2009, reading news stories
about a possible HIN1 pandemic may be enough to incite paralyzing fear in
the old brain.
There are enormous implications for mediators and negotiators to be
drawn from this body of work. For example, mediators ought to be cognizant
that discordant information is likely to activate a neural-emotional pattern
originating from a bygone era, and the consequences are likely to be
physical, and therefore psychophysical. It is well documented that by the
time one becomes conscious he is afraid, his body has increased the blood
supply to the legs in preparation for freeze, fight, or flight responses. It is
reasonable to infer that the effects of discordant information that activate
primitive parts of the brain may have similar effects in mediation. When a
mediator finds it necessary to question why a party rejects a good offer, he
may need to raise doubts about some of the assumptions underpinning the
party's stance. The mediator may try to point out weaknesses in the party's
arguments and strengths in the other side's case. He may suggest that the
party is assessing risky situations optimistically. For example, a party may
believe that they have an 80% chance of prevailing on an important
evidentiary motion, which may be, in the opinion of the mediator, an unduly
optimistic forecast.
In instances where the mediator has to present dissonant information to a
party who overvalues her own ideas and undervalues her opponent's, the
mediator ought to know this is likely to be a time when the executive
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function of the listener's brain is likely to be more reactive than proactive.
When a mediator has forced a party to consider that their arguments may be
flawed and that their opponents' arguments and offers have merit, it may not
be a good time to ask for a concession, despite the temptation to force a
concession during a moment of perceived weakness. 146
Moreover, the idea that two brains wrestle for emotional dominance
suggests that it is not sufficient to create proposed resolutions that "sound
good." The solutions must "feel good" as well. In other words, settlement has
to happen with the amygdala and the cortices both on board for the ride.
Finally, it seems that if a mediator can activate the amygdala in a way that
makes settlement "feel good," the amygdala will help construct stories that
satisfy the cortices, but that relationship is not symmetrical. The mediator
should try to bring both brains along, but if he has to choose one, he should
choose the older brain as the ally in persuasion.
D. Phase Four-Thinking About Offers: Presentism and Problems
Associated with Predicting State of Mind
If all goes well in a mediation or negotiation, there will come a point
when parties formulate and evaluate offers and compromises. At this
juncture, parties are encouraged-by mediators or by leading negotiation
texts-to stop dwelling on the past, stop thinking about blame for past
actions and retribution therefore, and start thinking prospectively and become
"future oriented."l 47 Mediators rely on parties imagining a future filled with
misery-inducing depositions, cross-examinations, and legal bills, and to
compare that to an unburdened future in which the parties presumably spend
their newfound free time in less miserable activities than litigation.
However, mediators ought to rid themselves of the illusion that this
technique is effective because it does what it purports to do. Helping parties
146 I am more confident that I can say that the older, earlier evolved midbrain is the
dominant engine in decisionmaking in the face of dissonant information than I am
confident in offering the best tactic for dealing with the neuroscientific effects. As in
many other situations, a mediator has to decide whether it is best to take parties as they
come and deal with or exploit their emotional states, or to soothe them until they can
"bargain rationally." This ethical situation is no different here than in other situations and
I cannot offer a sure-fire cure-all. But there is a part of me that believes that no one
should accept an offer unless the intellectual part of their brain is on board. I like to think
that people understand the tradeoffs in their interests between any particular offer and
other options (litigation, more negotiation).
147 See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra note 31; CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION
PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d ed. 2003); Michael
Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age ofSettlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727 (2005).
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envision alternative futures may help settle cases by casting competing
visions of the future in the minds of parties, but there is reason to believe that
the scenarios they envision are wholly unrelated to the feelings of happiness
or misery they will feel when they do settle or continue with the litigation.
Two excellent works by Daniel Gilbert and Dan Ariely demonstrate the
problems associated with forecasting how one will feel in the future.
In his best-selling book, Stumbling on Happiness, Harvard Psychologist
Daniel Gilbert boldly states that "[t]he human being is the only animal that
thinks about the future."l 48 He points out that we do it badly. Through his
discussion, Gilbert expertly demonstrates that the brain fills in blank spots
with fabricated data in much the same way as David Linden and Drew
Westen do in their abovementioned works.149 For example, Gilbert uses an
optical illusion to show that there is a blind spot in the eye. 150 The viewer of
the illusion is instructed to close her left eye and look at the leftmost of a pair
of images on a page-a magician on the left and a globe on the right.' 5 ' The
viewer moves the page toward his nose and at some point the globe
disappears. 152 Gilbert explains that when the globe is in the blind spot, the
eye sees white space all around the area of the blind spot and fills in the blind
spot with nearby data. The viewer thinks she see a white spot where there is a
globe, but she sees nothing and her brain "fixes it" for her.153 Gilbert moves
on past the optical illusion to demonstrate that people fill in words as well as
images, and he notes that eyewitness accounts of events are rife with false
remembrances. He makes a persuasive case that the human mind is expert at
"filling in holes."
After a discussion of how the past is part memory and part "spackle,"
Gilbert turns to studies on envisioning the future, and he demonstrates that
people are near incapable of determining what will make them happy in an
imagined future. 154 "If the past is a wall with some holes (in need of
spackle), the future is a hole with no walls. Memory uses the filling-in trick,
but imagination is the filling-in trick, and if the present lightly colors our
remembered pasts, it thoroughly infuses our imagined futures." Gilbert
discusses using the visual and auditory areas of the brain to create the human
148 DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 4 (2006).
14 9 Id. at 9-16.
150 Id. at 75-95.
151 Id. at 82.
152 Id. For me, about 14 inches from my face.
153 For more on optical illusions and the fascinating learnings they can reveal, see
EDWARD M. HUNDERT, LESSONS FROM AN OPTICAL ILLUSION: ON NATURE AND
NURTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES (1995); see also Birke & Fox, supra note 47.
154 GILBERT, supra note 148, at 113.
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imagination and shows how present states of mind (for example, "I am so
full I will never eat again") are a product of a uniquely human set of brain
processes that lead us to mispredict our future preferences (for example,
"funny ... only two hours later and I am ready to eat some more of that
Thanksgiving turkey .. . and maybe a small piece of pie. . . .").
With regard to preferences, Gilbert shows that when asked whether we
would like to eat our favorite meal at our favorite restaurant once per month,
or whether we would like more variety in what we eat, we choose variety.
But when a meal other than our favorite comes, we are mildly disappointed
and we wish we had ordered our favorite. Why? Because humans treat
sequential alternatives as if these alternatives were simultaneous.155 We think
about all dozen meals at once when we are deciding what we will want in the
future (simultaneous), but when we experience them with a month interval
between them (sequential), the favorite meal is "fresh" every time.
Gilbert demonstrates that predictions of the future are rooted in images
from the present so they are unreliable indicators of what will come to
pass.156 For example, people overestimate the effect of a catastrophe today
on their lives a year or two from now. People asked to think about how they
would feel after losing a limb or a loved one generally predict that they
would feel terrible about the event at the time it occurred, and that they
would continue to feel terrible about it a year or two later. However, people
who have suffered these tragedies and who are interviewed a year or two
later have other things on their mind.' 57 Two years after losing a leg, an
individual is more affected by whether she has a cold, has gotten a
promotion, suffered some other more recent loss, won the lottery, or some
other similarly unrelated and unpredictable event than by the loss of the leg.
A corroborating work by MIT Neuroeconomist Dan Ariely shows that
when people try to predict their future feelings, they underestimate the
impact of their state of mind at the time of the actual decision. 58 For
example, male college students were asked whether they would engage in a
variety of coercive behaviors in order to persuade an unwilling female
participant to engage in sexual relations. 1 S9 Some of these were "milder"
155 Id. at 133.
156 "Because we naturally use our present feelings as a starting point when we
attempt to predict our future feelings, we expect our future to feel a bit more like our
present than it actually will." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted).
I57 See, e.g., id.
158 Dan Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The Effect of
Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87, 89-90
(2006).
159 Id.
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behaviors, like asking a second time to go on a date even after being rejected,
and some were criminal or near-criminal in nature (threats and the like).160
When in a "cold" state (not sexually aroused), the men predicted that they
would be very unlikely to engage in any of the behavior, including the
mildest forms.' 6 ' In an aroused state, the men's responses were markedly
different.162 They were substantially more likely to predict they would
engage in coercive behavior when they were in an aroused state.163 There is
reason to believe that the aroused participant could better predict his behavior
in the aroused state than the unaroused participant could predict his aroused-
state behavior.
Taken together, these studies first show that not all good neuroscience is
the product of fMRI pictures, but more importantly that it is simply not
reasonable to ask a party in a lawsuit to predict how they will feel when the
lawsuit is over. Whether they will feel good or bad in a day or a week or a
year depends on many variables that have nothing to do with the lawsuit. It
may be the case that parties would prefer the demands of litigation to the
pangs of regret that they may feel post-settlement. 164
E. Phase Five-Closing in on the Deal: Loss Aversion and the FMRI
At the cusp of every settlement, parties must compare a particular deal
with their walkaway alternatives. They must compare a sure thing
(settlement) to a risky alternative (continued litigation).
One of the most powerful tools in the negotiator or mediator's toolbox is
the ability to frame this decision in a way that maximizes the likelihood of
settlement. Among the best understood of the methods of framing is loss
aversion.165 Research shows that people are generally risk-seeking when
facing certain losses and risk-averse when facing certain gains. That is,
gambling "double or nothing" is much more attractive when you are down
than when you are up. Prospect theory, the Nobel-prize winning theory
promulgated by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, demonstrates that
people are more sensitive to losing money or objects than to gaining the same
160 Id
161 Id. at 91-95.
162 Id.
163 Id
164 For more on anticipated regret and its projected impact on decisionmaking in
law, see Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory ofLitigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43 (1999).
165 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 5.
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amount. "[P]eople typically require a potential gain of at least $100 to make
up for exposure to a potential loss of $50 because the subjective impact of
losses is roughly twice that of gains."l 66
In mediation, awareness of this principle can result in mediators asking
plaintiffs to think of their baseline expectation as zero ("If there is no
settlement today, you get nothing ... in fact you spend more money soon"),
and to consider a settlement offer as a gain. Then the trial is a chance to
gamble for a bigger gain. For defendants, the focus is on certain losses-the
trial will cost a certain amount to defend, to which should be added the
expected value of the potential loss at trial. If that is the baseline, an offer can
be perceived as guaranteed savings, and the trial as a risky chance for future
savings.
A neuroscientific reason now exists for mediators to be concerned about
framing in a way that highlights possible losses. In The Neural Basis ofLoss
Aversion in Decision-Making Under Risk, Sabrina M. Tom, Craig R. Fox,
Christopher Trepel, and Russell A. Poldrack sought to determine "[w]hether
loss aversion reflects the engagement of distinct emotional processes when
potential losses are considered."' 6 7 The authors noted that sensitivity to loss
was often thought about as having associations with negative emotions, and
most specifically fear and anxiety. This inquiry is important for negotiators
and mediators, because if loss aversion were based in a fear response,
mediators might wish to intervene at the time of consideration of acceptance
of a deal-and the attendant loss that comes with giving up one's right to
vindicate herself in court-in a way that deals with the fear of loss.
Tom and her colleagues put subjects in the fMRI and allowed them to
respond to accept (strongly or weakly), reject (strongly or weakly), or show
indifference to proposed gambles with varying degrees of risk. The gambles
were real-that is, the subjects were "playing" for real dollars that they got to
keep. Amounts ranged from $10 to $40 gains and $5 to $20 losses
(replicating the 2/1 gain/loss sensitivity). Brain imaging data surprised the
researchers. When analyzing the data to determine which brain regions were
activated during the studies, the scientists found there was a "gain responsive
network" which included "regions previously shown to be associated with
the receipt of monetary rewards" 68 The researchers hypothesized that if loss
aversion were driven by fear, they would find increased activity in the brain
166 Sabrina M. Tom et al., The Neural Basis of Loss Aversion in Decision-Making
Under Risk, 315 Sci. 515, 515 (2007).
167 Id
168 Id. at 516. These regions are the dorsal ventral striatum, the ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the VMPFC, the OFC, and dopaminergic
midbrain regions.
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regions associated with such emotions, and as losses increased, brain activity
in these regions would increase. However, rather than seeing increased
activities in the fear centers, researchers saw decreased activity in the reward
centers. 169 The portion of the brain associated with a variety of pleasurable
sensations was stimulated in gain frames and was suppressed in its activation
in loss frames.
In the context of deciding in mixed gain-loss situations, fear of loss is an
inappropriate characterization. Instead, concern about loss more likely leads
to an inability to envision pleasant scenarios, which in turn may inhibit
parties' ability to weigh the value of settlement against the value of
continued litigation.
If loss aversion suppresses the ability to imagine reward, it may have
additional effects on one's ability to think creatively about how to meet their
desire for reward. If loss aversion is based in a creativity suppression
response, it may be a very bad thing during brainstorming to create a loss
frame of mind in parties. However, it may be a useful tool at the end of the
day. If things look stark at the end of the day, that is probably not a bad
thing. In fact, mediators often report that they become increasingly
evaluative as the day wears longer. Perhaps this increasing impatience
demonstrated by mediators and others may be an evolutionary response to a
dulled decisionmaker, who, after assimilating the loss of an expectation that
typically attends compromise and settlement, cannot imagine which would
provide more reward: settlement or trial. Neuroscience may give mediators
reason to reserve their attempts at loss framing for those times in mediation
when parties are in greatest need of forceful direction.
F. Last Ditch Efforts-Mediator Proposals: Invoking Involuntary
Pleasure
When a mediation gets stuck and it looks like the session might end
without a settlement, the mediator faces a choice of whether to offer a
proposal. There is much debate about whether a mediator should ever
become directive such that he pushes parties to settle. Conventional wisdom
suggests that a mediator should not be an advocate for a settlement of his
own creation, but should instead act as a counselor to the parties, helping
them to compare options with alternatives and making informed choices.
According to a "party centered approach," if parties cannot decide near the
169 Id. at 517 ("[T]he present study demonstrates that, in the context of
decisionmaking, potential losses are represented by decreasing activity in regions that
seem to code for subjective value rather than by increasing activity in regions associated
with negative emotions.").
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end of the day, a mediator should not tell them where they should settle, as
that is a decision only the parties should make. However, if a mediator agrees
to make an affirmative proposal, should he be concerned about this being a
breach of the mediator aspiration of a "party-driven" process?
Perhaps the strictest of ethicists would say never to make a proposal and
that a mediator proposal is a per se ethical breach. However, a study by
William Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr, and Daniel Burghart at the University of
Oregon muddies the waters. These scientists examined how subjects reacted
when put into the fMRI to see if evidence could be gathered to support
competing theories of giving: "pure altruism" (giving motivated only by
concern for the objects of the charity), or "warm glow altruism" (giving
motivated by the positive feeling one feels when giving). 170 The subjects'
brains were scanned when they were making voluntary donations to a food
bank, and when they were forced to make involuntary payments.171 The
subjects each started with a real money bank account, and the charity was a
real local charity that would actually receive the money. The scientists
observed that the brain signature was remarkably similar in both the donation
and the tax situations. 172 In finding support for the "warm glow" theory, they
reported:
This is the first evidence we know of demonstrating that mandatory taxation
for a good cause can produce activation in specific brain areas that have
been tied to concrete, individualistic rewards. ... The fact that mandatory
transfers to a charity elicit activity in reward-related areas suggests that
even mandatory taxation can produce satisfaction for taxpayers. 173
When first published, this work was reported across the nation. 174 One of
the least liked laws-forced taxation-produced the same effect on the brain
as a voluntary donation to charity.' 75
170 William T. Harbaugh et al., Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving
Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, 316 SCI. 1622, 1622-24 (2007). My most
charitable friend says "don't give 'til it hurts; give 'til it feels good."
171 Id.
172 That is, the ventral striatum, an area known to activate in the presence or reward,
was activated equally in both conditions. Id. at 1624.
173 Id. at 1623-24.
174 John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2007, at Fl.
175 Id. It is worth noting that while subjects indicated a preference for having more
choice rather than less (manifesting as a stated preference for voluntary donations over
forced taxation), having choice actually decreased the amount of giving to support the
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A follow-up piece adds a review of the economic and neuroeconomic
literature on charitable giving, and inclusion of a third possible motivation
for giving dubbed "impure altruism" (giving motivated by expected rewards
due to reputational enhancement). The bottom line remains the same:
people's sense of what will make them feel good is not accurate, and a forced
concession feels about as good as a voluntary one. 176 While mediators should
not make too much out of too little data, resolution of conflicts is something
that may be worth pushing to the edge of ethics, and lasting satisfaction can
come from coercive environments. In short, maybe a mediator's proposal,
even if argued forcefully, produces the greater good if it generates forced
concessions resulting in closure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Neuroscience, like most disciplines, provokes more questions than it
answers. While there are studies that are widely accepted that corroborate
and sometimes further existing knowledge about decisions, there are also
studies that are merely directional and ought not to be counted on as proof of
anything, but instead as evidence for an unproven set of propositions. As a
colleague expressed to me, the Nobel Prize in Neuroeconomics will be based
on a paper that has not been written yet. This statement sums up the field
quite well in that it implies that the application of neuroscience to
decisionmaking will yield results worthy of a Nobel Prize, but that the field
is too much in its infancy to have yet created a Nobel Prize worthy
contribution.
A further defense of the work comes from Professors Mayr, Harbaugh,
and Tenkersley, who write:
[N]eural data provide a way of testing economic models that is very
different from the empirical and experimental data that have been typically
used. This presents the possibility of independent evidence in favor of, or
against, various models of behavior.... neural evidence builds on a rich
base of knowledge from animal physiology and from human brain imaging
work about the functional relevance of specific neuroanatomical areas. This
means that there is the potential for generating interesting new hypotheses
about motivations from observed patterns of neural activations.. .results can
feed back into the neuroscience literature and further increase our general
public good.
176 Harbaugh, supra note 170, at 308.
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understanding of how the brain makes decisions and experiences their
consequences. 177
However, long before that Nobel Prize-worthy work is written, and
before experiencing Mayr and friends' "increase in general understanding,"
many fMRI experiments will take place and many lawsuits will be settled
through negotiation and mediation. Aligning experiments and settlement
activities might produce both better science and better dispute resolution
techniques. A necessary precondition is that a dialogue must be nurtured.
between neuroscientists and dispute resolution professionals, but that
dialogue needs to be structured to overcome differences between the
disciplines. I highlight three important issues in the remaining pages.
A. There is Tension Between Research and Practice
Tension exists between scientists and practitioners, in that scientists err
on the side of caution and practitioners are more willing and sometimes eager
to incorporate unproven hypotheses into their work. Scientists are quick to
point out the limitations of neuroscience. The fMRI, for example, as useful as
it is, does not show pictures of emotions, but instead shows magnetic signals
demonstrating activation in parts of the brain. These activated parts of the
brain may be associated with particular functions, but may not be necessary
to perform that function. Further, the link between activation and action is
not known to be causal, but clearly is correlative.178 Proof of necessity must
be achieved through other means, currently the study of lesions or
transcranial magnetic stimulation studies, each of which has weaknesses of
its own. Moreover, concepts discovered in cognitive psychology fail to map
onto a single and dedicated area of the brain, making it impossible to make
reverse inferences, that is to "infer the presence of specific mental processes"
from observations of activation.179 The visual cortex may activate during
sight, but it also lights up during visualization. The best technology provides
directional data that will lead to the type of discoveries that practitioners
hunger for; but that day is not upon us yet. 80
177 William Harbaugh et al., Neuroeconomics of Charitable Giving and
Philanthropy, in NEUROECONOMICs: DECISION MAKING AND THE BRAIN 308-18 (Paul W.
Glimcher et al. eds., 2008).
178 Poldrack, supra note 9, at 223.
179 Id
180 Id. at 225 ("I believe that [fMRI and TMS] will provide the basis for the next
generation of neuroimaging in combination with more detailed models of neural
connectivity and computational modeling.").
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B. The Need for Collaborative Creation of Testable Hypotheses
Scientists who knew that their life's work would have no meaningful
impact on the world-including forming the basis for a future important
finding-might be depressed. Similarly, mediators who thought they were
employing useful interventions might be upset to realize that settlements
were occurring despite their harmful tactics. Surely, by working together,
each group can avoid its respective fears, being either "correct but irrelevant"
in the case of science, or "of moment and wrong" in the case of dispute
resolvers. Indeed, they can bridge the gap between science and practice.
In a Venn diagram that describes the set of all possible hypotheses that
neuroscientists might wish to test and the set of all possible hypotheses that
negotiators and mediators might find useful to test, there is overlap. The
initial challenge is for them to meet-until fMRI decision theorists start to
take up residence in law schools or law professor-decision theorists start to
occupy medical school faculty positions, pioneers from each group must take
the initiative.181
In the hope of furthering this nascent conversation, I offer the following
hypotheses useful to negotiators and mediators that might be amenable to
testing by neuroscientists. Or, perhaps a neuroscientist will explain to me
why these hypotheses are fundamentally flawed. Either way, the
conversation continues and both dispute resolution and neuroscience are the
better for it.
SET ONE: Fear and Creativity
* Being in a fearful state will result in closemindedness to creative
offers.
* There are verbal interventions likely to induce fear.
181 One fledgling effort by a group called the Master Mediators Institute brought a
group of approximately twenty mediators to the Cognitive Neuroscience Center at Duke
University for an immersion course in neuroscience. Participants dissected a brain,
watched an fMRI test, and discussed the overlap between our fields with a distinguished
group of mediators for four days. While no concrete product emerged, the event
demonstrated the difficulty and potential upside of finding that intersection. For
information about the event, see Robert Benjamin, The Science Behind the Sense:
Exploring Cognitive Neuroscience, in Decision Making, THE MASTER MEDIATOR
INSTrrUTE, Apr. 2009, available at http://mastermediatorinstitute.org/MMI/?page
id=420. Further, while it is not a statistically significant survey, on the half dozen or so
occasions I have presented on this topic, attendance exceeds expectations. There is
curiosity on the ground, and practitioners and academics in dispute resolution need to
continue to reach out.
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* There are likewise interventions that are effective in calming fearful
people.
* If such interventions could be documented, mediators could enhance
the likelihood of a creative solution if they refrain from inducing fear
or if they could effectively calm fearful individuals.
SET TWO: Realigning Fear Networks
* The catharsis that comes with telling a story is the result of a party's
realigning scattered and discordant neural impulses in a way that
makes the network more efficient and the memory more readily
understood.
* Effective listening and refraining by a mediator contribute to this
positive realignment.
* After a mediator helps realign a negative neural pattern into
something more positive (or less fear inducing), the fear moves
closer to extinction, even after the mediator is no longer present.
SET THREE: Mediation and Mirroring
* The introduction of a mediator in the chain of communication
produces an effect on the impact of mirror neurons to effectively
guide parties to common emotional understanding.
* The longer the time between when a party communicates to a
mediator and when that mediator transmits the information to the
receiving party, the less alike the neural patterns of the speaker and
the receiver. Conversely, the shorter the time lapse, the more
effective the mediator is in inducing the speaker's emotional state to
the receiver.
C. A Mediated Burden of Proof-Resonance
Practitioners cannot wait for scientific certainty, but they are equally ill-
advised to build practices on data that are at times scanty and other times
mistranslated. I suggest that neuroscience may provide hypotheses that can
withstand the internal scrutiny that mediators and some self-aware
negotiators may be well-suited to test.
Neuroscience shows that all human brains share similarities in their
physical makeup and functionality. While humans' behaviors are not similar,
the manner in which we process data or mediate conversations between the
old and new brain may be more universal, like facial expression. The
freeze/flight/flight response seems to be rooted in something common to the
entire species. Perhaps other behaviors are as well. Mediators and negotiators
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might be justified in assuming that certain aspects of their experience of the
world are not eclectic or unique to them. If a negotiator or mediator could
extrapolate from their own reactions to an offer, a concession, or any other
part of the settlement process, he might be able to better understand the likely
impact of the offer or concession to the other side. A negotiator or mediator
could choose interventions consonant with the brain's natural methods of
assimilating and evaluating information, and making decisions.1 82
Self-reflective practitioners of dispute resolution have found, and
examined through introspection, parts of their behavior and decisionmaking
processes, many of which are likely species-specific. Through understanding
their own feelings and reactions, they understand the feelings and reactions
of others. As biology is foundational, truths for all must be truths for the
individual negotiator and mediator. If, while practicing, these professionals
unearth potential decisionmaking commonalities, neuroscientists may find it
possible and productive to confirm these hypotheses in the lab. For the
mediator, the only current tool available is to keep up with the emergent
literature on neuroscience, and then to self-test a concept for resonance. Peer
review may remain the standard for publication in scientific journals, but
lawyers are comfortable with lower standards of proof. Trial lawyers
introduce scientific evidence into court based on standards different than
those of scientists. Why should mediators be discouraged from having a
different standard for their practices? The matter is akin to the difference
between a criminal and a civil burden of proof: Scientists need something
like "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to be credible to their peers,
while mediators and negotiators are forced by practical considerations to
employ a standard closer to "preponderance of the evidence." The
appropriate standard for a negotiator or mediator to use when considering
whether a piece of neuroscience is sufficiently well developed to be used in
her practice is whether the findings from a study resonate with her
experience of the world. In the case of mirror neurons, where there exists
disagreement in the scientific community, resonance is all we have.183 The
central inquiry in this article is whether neuroscience has produced findings
that are sufficiently established such that mediators ought to incorporate
182 Owen Jones refers to this concept in lawmaking as "The Law of Law's
Leverage." The more a piece of law accords with basic biological human tendencies, the
more likely it is to be obeyed. See Owen Jones, supra note 8, at 2100-01.
183 As mentioned above, there are many scientists who both disbelieve and believe
in mirror neurons. A more instinctual approach is seen in the work of Dr. David Linden,
who writes that "[w]e assume, rightly I believe, that mirror neurons are also present in
humans. But at the time of this writing that has not been confirmed." LINDEN, supra note
3, at 105. Linden is a professor of neuroscience at the Johns Hopkins University.
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these findings into their practices. To most neuroscientists, the answer would
likely be "not yet." However, to most mediators, and to me, the answer is
"yes." It is a certainty that neuroscience has earned a place with the other
three methods used to understand dispute resolution practices. It does not
supplant psychology, economics, or self-study, and it does not fit neatly
under any of these categories. Rather, in a short period of time, neuroscience
has become a robust source of new data and hypotheses, reaching maturity in
a blink of an eye relative to peer disciplines.
There is much that has not been covered in this article. There has been no
discussion of the effect of music on the mind-should mediators consciously
choose a settlement soundtrack?l 84 There has been no discussion of oxytocin
and smells, despite confirmation that they have an impact on people's
willingness to get along.' 85 I have not discussed a variety of documented
states of mind that may impede mediation, including sleep deprivation and its
effect on choices about gains and losses.186
Rather than pretend that one article can possibly describe all the ways in
which the new science of brain and mind may apply to the resolution of
disputes and the creation of deals, my hope is more modest. I hope that this
article has effectively cautioned readers to sift neuroscientific wheat from
chaff, and has inspired them to read more about neuroscience, to create
hypotheses to test, and to seek out local neuroscientists and discuss how
work in the field relates to work in the laboratory. Perhaps one day
neuroscience will radically alter or supplant those other fields, but that day is
not yet upon us. Between now and the first Nobel in neuro-decisionmaking,
184 See, e.g., DANIEL LEVITIN, THIS Is YOUR BRAIN ON MusIc: THE SCIENCE OF A
HUmAN OBSESSION (2007); OLIVER SACKS, MUSICOPHILIA: TALES OF MUSIC AND THE
BRAIN (Vintage Books 2008) (2006).
185 Hormone Involved in Reproduction May Have Role in the Maintenance of
Relationship, Sci. DAILY, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.oxytocin.org/oxytoc
("The hormone best known for its role in inducing labor may influence our ability to
bond with others, according to researchers at the University of California, San
Francisco."); M.J. Stephey, Can Oxytocin Ease Shyness?, TIME, July 21, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1820828,00.html.
Best known for controlling contractions during labor [, oxytocin] also plays a
key role in other fundamental human urges-including the desire to connect with
others. 'Somehow, the peptide increases trust, or alters the way individuals see each
other,' says Tom Insel, director of the National Institute of Mental Health.
Id.
186 See, e.g., V. Venkatraman et al., Sleep Deprivation Elevates Expectation of
Gains and Attenuates Response to Losses Following Risky Decisions, 30 SLEEP 603
(2007).
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readers should see neuroscience as a helpful addition to economics, cognitive
and behavioral psychology, and self-awareness.1 87 Armed by what I have
read, I intend to have longer joint sessions, to take a break after a party tells
me about the harrowing events underlying the litigation, to be circumspect
about my ability to help a party envision whether a settlement will create
more peace of mind than continuing litigation, and perhaps to press a little
harder at the end for resolution-that is, until some willing and interested
neuroscientist teaches me otherwise.
187 At least a trio of credible neuroscientists agrees that behavioral science and
neuroscience make excellent bedfellows. John A. Clithero, Dharol Tankersley, and Scott
A. Huettel write:
By identifying interesting choice behavior and creating models for the
associated cognitive processes, neuroecononics research can generate better
paradigms for human neuroimaging studies and target behavior to replicate in
animal and clinical studies (behavior). By grounding conclusions about brain
function in behavioral effects such as choice parameters or individual decisions,
neuroeconomics can unify cognitive and neural theories of behavior.
John A. Clithero et al., Foundations of Neuroeconomics: From Philosophy to
Practice, 30 PLoS BIOL. 2348 (2008).
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